James Madison University

JMU Scholarly Commons
Global CWD Repository

Center for International Stabilization and
Recovery

3-2006

National Explosive Remnants of War Response Study, Cambodia
Dave McCracken
Bruce Powell
Leng Sochea

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons, Public
Policy Commons, and the Social Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
McCracken, Dave; Powell, Bruce; and Sochea, Leng, "National Explosive Remnants of War Response
Study, Cambodia" (2006). Global CWD Repository. 153.
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd/153

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery at
JMU Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Global CWD Repository by an authorized
administrator of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact dc_admin@jmu.edu.

National Explosive Remnants of War Response Study, Cambodia

by

Norwegian Peoples Aid in collaboration with the Cambodian Mine Action Authority
Study Team
Dave McCracken, Study Team Leader,
Bruce Powell, Development Consultant
Leng Sochea, Deputy Secretary-General CMAA

Phnom Penh, Cambodia
March, 2006

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We express our heartfelt thanks to those people and organizations that contributed
their time and knowledge to making this study a success. In particular, this study is made
possible by the foresight of the Mine Action community and the supporting donors from
Government of Japan, Australia Aid (AusAID), United Nations Development Program
(UNDP) and Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA). Their commitment advances the Explosive
Remnant of War sector towards reaching the possibility of an impact free environment.
Numerous sector specialists, key stakeholders and their staffs were consulted for
their expertise, opinions and sage advice for this study. For these major contributions to
our understanding of ERW response needs in Cambodia, our team gives special thanks
to:
Sam Sotha, Director-General CMAA
Leng Sochea, Deputy Director-General CMAA
MGEN Sem Sovanny, RCAF and CMAA
MGEN Ouk Cum Lek, National Police Ministry of Interior
Kem Sophan, Director General CMAC
Heng Rattana, Deputy Director General CMAC
Him Vandy, Planning and Operations CMAC
Lam Sambo, EOD Operations, CMAC
Lim Ly, Database, CMAC
Ian Thomas, Database TA UNDP, CMAA
In Channa, Database, CMAA
Richard Boulter, Country Program Manager, HALO Trust
Yamada Yoshitaka , JMAS
Rupert Leighton, Country Program Manager, MAG
Gary Fenton, STA, MAG
Andy Kervell, TA, AVI
Scott Rankin, Program Manager, AVI

ii

CONTENTS
Acknowledgements ..............................................................................................................................ii
List of Tables ........................................................................................................................................v
List of Figures ......................................................................................................................................vi
Executive Summary ...........................................................................................................................vii
Part I: Taking Stock ...........................................................................................................................10
Study Purpose and Background ............................................................................ 10
ERW Contamination in Cambodia ....................................................................... 12
Origins and nature of ERW contamination in Cambodia ......................... 13
Scope of ERW contamination in Cambodia ............................................. 14
ERW Data Sources ................................................................................... 15
Organizational Capacity of ERW Response in Cambodia ................................... 18
National ERW Service Providers.............................................................. 19
International ERW Service Providers....................................................... 24
EOD & BAC Operations in Cambodia................................................................. 29
Operational & Technical Capacity............................................................ 30
Training Capacity...................................................................................... 39
Donor Interventions & Funding Environment...................................................... 40
Part II: ERW Analysis & Needs Assessment.................................................................................43
Potential surface area affected by ERW contamination ....................................... 43
Essential Components (Needs) of a Cambodian National ERW Response.......... 57
National ERW Sector Good Governance & Legal Framework............................ 57
ERW Role Definition................................................................................ 63
Profiling ERW Threat, Impact, and Risk.................................................. 65
Information & Knowledge Management .................................................. 69

iii

ERW Center(s) of Excellence................................................................... 71
Integration of ERW Operations ................................................................ 73
End State Programming ........................................................................................ 74
Part III: Study Recommendations ...................................................................................................78
Strategic Level..................................................................................................... 78
Institutional Level ............................................................................................... 84
Operational Level.................................................................................................. 87
Practical Measures in 2006 ................................................................................... 88
References ...........................................................................................................................................89

iv

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 - Summary of Survey & Data Sources Available in Cambodia .......................... 18
Table 2 - Summary of EOD Operational and Technical Capacity in Cambodia.............. 34
Table 3 - Dutch & Belgian Supported EOD Training for CMAC 1993-2000.................. 39
Table 4 - Breakdown of L1S mixed contamination areas by type of ordnance (Land vs
Air) ............................................................................................................................ 45
Table 5 - Comparison of SEADAB records vs L1S estimated surface area affected by
single and multiple cluster munitions strikes............................................................ 48
Table 6 - Possible Scope of BAC & EOD Tasks.............................................................. 49

v

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 - Mines/UXO Victims in Cambodia................................................................... 17
Figure 2 - EOD Outputs for 2003-2005............................................................................ 31
Figure 3 - CMAC Depiction of EOD Operations 1996-2005........................................... 32
Figure 4 - Close up of CMAC EOD Operations in Prey Veng Province 2003-2005 ....... 33
Figure 5- Mine & UXO Casualties by Province............................................................... 53
Figure 6 - Trends in Mine/UXO Casualties Compared to Casualties Attributed to
Intentional Handling ................................................................................................. 54
Figure 7 - Geographic Distribution of All UXO Casualties Compared to UXO Handling
Victims ...................................................................................................................... 54
Figure 8 - Development Process of Data - Information - Knowledge into Wisdom ........ 70

vi

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The purpose of this study was to initiate a strategic dialogue through an
assessment of the explosive remnants of war issues facing the future of the mine action
sector in Cambodia. The study was conducted in a phased program between 28
November to 31 March 2006 by a combined team of two Norwegian Peoples Aid
contracted independent consultants and a senior official from the Cambodian Mine
Action Authority.
Originally, called a “National EOD Study” the full spectrum of the explosive
remnants of war impact on Cambodia necessitated a wider focus of inquiry to address the
future of the sector in a holistic manner. The study was renamed “National Explosive
Remnants of War (ERW) Study – Cambodia” to appropriately reflect the problems
associated with ERW contamination and the necessary responses for this long term issue.
The report takes stock of the mine action situation, analyses the broad issues of ERW
contamination and determines the needs for an effective long-term National ERW
Response thru the process of “End State Programming”. The underlying principle guiding
this study is developing national self-sufficiency to undertake professional ERW
Response programs that meet national development goals and objectives.
Early 1990’s mine action predictions determined that mine clearance
organizations would be working in the Thai-Cambodia border area within a decade, this
is occurring now. The main body of work removing high impact landmine contamination
from the populated central Cambodia is near completion. Accelerating the end of the
landmine impact is attainable through innovative area reduction techniques, now being
introduced. The remaining high impact border contaminated areas can arguable be
reduced within a 5-10 year period.
Once, area reduction makes large-scale mine clearance operations redundant, the
more challenging long term issues associated with explosive remnants of war such as
abandoned munitions, unexploded ordnance i.e. air-dropped munitions etc. can assume
national priority. The scale of the ERW contamination in Cambodia is only now being
understood, first evidenced by the shift from landmine victims to unexploded ordnance
incidents. This study is the first step towards comprehending existing EOD operational
data and a wealth of un-analyzed data on aerial bombardment that has not been fully
exploited to define the scope of ERW impact on Cambodian society.
Twenty years of continuous warfare liberally polluted vast areas of Cambodia
with land service munitions1, and air-dropped munitions2 in qualities much higher than
originally imagined by mine action planners. Initial estimates indicate that up to 50,000
tons of general-purpose bombs3 and upwards of 3.75 million individual unexploded air
dropped bomblets contaminate Cambodia. EOD operational records also indicate a
general contamination level of up to eighteen (18) ERW items per hectare have been
recovered, outside of mine clearance operations. Additionally, dioxin contaminated areas
caused by herbicide spraying during the Vietnam War in eastern Cambodia adds to the
cocktail of hazardous challenges facing Cambodia.
1

Land service munitions include grenades, mortars, rockets, and artillery etc.
Air-dropped munitions include rockets, bombs, cluster munitions (bomblets) etc.
3
Large air-dropped bombs ranging from 250lb-2000lbs.
2
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Finding the optimum balance of technology and method to address ERW threats
in the challenging SE Asia environment stretches the limits of humanitarian mine action
empirical knowledge. These challenges are similar in UXO Laos where a series of
systems trials are revolutionizing their approach to a long-term ERW strategy, lessons
which can be introduced in Cambodia. Clearly a transition from “mine centric” thinking
to ERW Response using explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and battle area clearance
(BAC) techniques and methodologies requires development. Mine action service
providers will need to adapt their organizational structures, methods and technology for
these changes. The main finding of this report indicate the technical aspects of evolving
an ERW Response to be less challenging than creating governmental impetus for
strategic planning, organizational change, human resource development and developing
appropriate structures, and facilities.
The Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) responsibility and commitment to
mine action is generally positive allowing an unimpeded environment for mine action
agencies to perform their humanitarian and developmental work. RGC contributes funds
and facilities that support CMAA and CMAC management although only represents a
fraction of the costs required to deliver the volume of mine action or ERW Response
activity required in Cambodia. CMAA and CMAC are 95% funded through the
generosity of the international community. In this regard, the mine action sector is neither
sustainable in its present form nor prepared to develop a long-term National ERW
Response capacity.
Whether by design or default the mine action sector will undergo transformation
as the impact of mines lessens, and priorities shift to other development issues during the
next 5-10 years. The national strategy is crafted from a limited analysis of the Level One
Impact Survey (L1S), which presents an unbalanced picture of the overall ERW situation.
Fundamental analytical and management processes are required to plan a longterm ERW Response. Starting with a realistic threat analysis that re-evaluates residual
landmine contamination with all other ERW contamination to determine actual impact
and acceptable risk levels on Cambodian communities is needed. Thereafter a risk
management program that addresses community and national development needs must be
designed. Finally, a revision of the national strategy and policies with end state
programming for national institutions (CMAA, CMAC, RCAF and National Police) as
the guiding principle to meet these challenges is necessary to shape the National ERW
Response future.
The mine action sector has developed into a hybrid collection of agencies, with
additional government agencies entering the field. Over a decade of development has
created a national capacity for coordination and direct implementation of operations.
CMAA legislative agenda is progressing enabling direct governmental oversight of the
sector, although ability to coordinate the development of RCAF and National Police
operations is questionable at this time. RCAF and the National Police will increasing
become key stakeholders and national service providers in their own right. However,
their roles are complementary and ancillary to CMAA and CMAC’s main national
service roles, which cannot be duplicated under the current level of national funding.
Defining the roles of stakeholders is critical in the final development of the ERW
sector. Intervention/assistance priorities must stay the course following a decade of
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capacity building with existing national service providers such as CMAA and CMAC.
Changing development strategies creating parallel structures would dilute existing
capacity rather than strengthening or preparing the sector for the future. The opportunity
to structure a holistic government strategy inclusive of RCAF and the National Police
that shapes the future for ERW Response in Cambodia is now.
Cambodia requires forward thinking leadership and innovative end state
programming focused on developing national civil service organizations to address the
longer-term national strategic goals and objectives. Change must be targeted at three
levels simultaneously; strategic, institutional, and operational, embracing change
dynamics while adapting to new ERW roles (See Part III Study Recommendations).
Interventions by a progressive donor community providing targeted support thru
incremental capacity building services aimed to build national self-sufficiency should be
the motivating catalyst for transition.
Cambodia’s last explosive remnant of war should be removed by a professional
Cambodian ERW technician, deployed by his/her government, and supported by its
treasury. Preparing for that eventuality is the responsibility of the RGC dedicated towards
national capacity building, alongside a supportive international community.
All the aforementioned interventions are achievable with strong national
leadership and donor community encouraging change and introducing innovative
measures that benefit the ERW community as a whole. This National ERW Response
Study starts the strategic dialogue for those changes to occur.
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PART I: TAKING STOCK
Study Purpose and Background
This study was initially conceived through a consultative process with Cambodian
Mine Action Center (CMAC) and Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA) to review the explosive
ordnance disposal EOD sector and later at the request of a supportive donor community
broadened to incorporate a more holistic study of this sector.
The need for a deeper understanding of the mine action sector is based upon the
innovative work investigating munitions tampering, and the shift from mine victims to
unexploded ordnance related victims. This study is a logical progression investigating
trends leading towards addressing the wider issues of explosive remnants of war (ERW)
and looking at this sectors future once the landmine problem is largely resolved.
Maintaining a policy for strengthening national capacity, NPA committed to a joint study
with the Cambodian Mine Action Authority (CMAA) to develop strategic
recommendations (Bonnet, 2005).
Originally, named the “National Explosive Ordnance Disposal Study”, this study
evolved through a dynamic discovery process that revealed aspects of ERW, which
constituted further definition and inquiry. This evolution resulted in addressing an
extensive set of ERW related issues and consequently renamed appropriately, the
“National Explosive Remnants of War Response Study – Cambodia”.
The purpose of conducting a “National Explosive Remnants of War Response
Study – Cambodia” is to support the development of strategic innovation that meets the
challenges of ERW response beyond the reduction of the landmine problem. The study
was a phased participatory process spaced over the following periods:
a. Phase I - Mobilization & Literature Review (30 Nov-10 Dec 05),
b. Phase II - Review of ERW Systems Study at UXO Lao Sekong Province
(11 Dec-18 Dec 05)
c. Phase III - Data Collection & Initial ERW Workshop (03 Jan-27 Jan 06),
d. Phase IV - Needs Analysis (27 Jan-24 Feb 06), and
e. Phase V - Final ERW Workshop (24 March 06)
f. Phase VI – Draft - Final Report Edit & Review (10-31 March 06)
The study team consisted of multi-disciplined professionals selected for their
familiarity with Cambodian Mine Action sector development. Norwegian Peoples Aid
contracted one EOD consultant as Team Leader (Dave McCracken), a development
consultant (Bruce Powell) and a senior Cambodian Mine Action Authority (CMAA)
official (Leng Sochea). Over the period January-March 2006, the study team met with a
wide variety of national and international stakeholders traveling throughout Cambodia
conducting field visits with organizations implementing EOD operations.
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Study Composition & Objectives
The study is divided into three components addressing the main issues concerning
development of the ERW sector in strategic, institutional and operational terms;
a. Part I – Taking Stock,
b. Part II – ERW Analysis & Needs Assessment,
c. Part III - Summary of Recommendations, and
d. References.
Working directly with the stakeholders the study team addressed relative issues
from strategic to operational level developing a holistic understanding of the entire ERW
sector in Cambodia. Specifically, these summarized objectives were addressed:
a. Objective 1 - To conduct an independent review and analysis of
achievements and present challenges faced by the overall EOD sector in
the country. Building on lessons learned from various operators'
experience, mapping present capacity and thoroughly documenting best
practices for the creation of an EOD national strategy.
b. Objective 2 - To provide an in-depth insight into the present EOD
dynamics and investigate practical ways through which the EOD sector
can best benefit from an enhanced collaboration between the various
stakeholders and be grounded in the genuine participation of local
communities. As such, the study will closely look into the potential
involvement and coordination between other key stakeholders like
CMAA, national police, RCAF (Royal Cambodian Armed Forces), local
and national authorities, scrap metal dealers, development NGOs etc.
c. Objective 3 - To present recommendations as to future technical assistance
requirements and strategic orientations for the future of the EOD sector
with a focus on both medium and long-term financial and technical
sustainability (Bonnet, 2005).
The complex environment to which Cambodian mine action has evolved
comprises, organizational development, donor requirements, emerging technologies and
methodologies all contributing to hybrid situation unique in the region. Influencing
factors include culture, political instability, demographic changes, and economic
difficulties all challenge this mine action community. A holistic understanding of the
mine action sector is necessary to begin a review of the sector achievements and way
forward.
The study started with a systematic plan including a rapid collection of available
publications and papers for a formal literature review of the Cambodian mine action
sector. The literature review spanned the breadth of strategic, institutional, operational
data/information, planning documentation, technical procedures for mine action and EOD
operations. The availability of policy papers, standing operating procedures (SOP’s) and
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operational reports enabled the study team to drill down in detail the workings and
development of the mine action sector. The literature review underpinned the design
process for primary and secondary key informant interviews, field visits and other
information gathering activity. A comprehensive list of fully referenced sources is
provided with this study.
The main field visit activities involved CMAC, RCAF, MAG, HALO and JMAS.
and with secondary visits to key experts in specialized fields. Notably, the study team
leader was experienced reviewing RCAF capacity to undertake Mine Action and EOD
operations after conducting an in-depth analysis in Sept-Oct 2005. Data collection and
analysis consumed a considerable portion of study time with CMAC and CMAA
databases developing queries, extracting unprocessed data, and creating information.
Additional data and information was provided by HALO Trust and MAG databases on
their EOD and BAC operations.
This study was limited by the time allocated (52 days) to cover a diverse spectrum
of unprocessed data available to the mine action community and the creative process of
determining the needs for a futuristic ERW Response capacity. All objectives of this
study received full attention within the limited time available for detailed investigation.
The strength of this study is the team’s experience and understanding of the
development environment in Cambodia. An open balanced approach with key informants
and organizations during interviews created a sense of trust and credibility.
Consequently, dialogue between key informants field operator and team members
provided candid points of view and open provision of information.
Fundamental principle of this study was taking stock of achievements and current
capacities in relationship to developing a futuristic ERW Response sector. Criticizing the
performance of various agencies developing national mine action capacity is not
considered constructive or warranted for the purposes of this study. This study does not
intend to criticize individuals or portray organizations in a negative sense. Conversely,
our intent is to provide informed constructive observations and analysis for the Mine
Action sector to allow a strategic dialogue for the way ahead to create a Cambodian
professional ERW Response.
ERW Contamination in Cambodia
The complexity of the explosive remnants of war contamination warrants a
comprehensive overview that explains the environment in which it exists and
organizations must function. Various accounts of historical conflicts and the mine action
sector development exist, although few are fully informed or unbiased. This report
intends to portray as accurately as possible the situation as it stands today.
A well-documented history of conflict in Cambodia and the Southeast Asia region
exists covering wars lasting several decades (Chanda, 1986). The advent of modern
warfare with massive use of landmines, land service and air dropped munitions created a
human security dilemma in post-conflict Cambodia. Cambodia is among the Southeast
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Asia nations most heavily contaminated by explosive remnants of war (ERW) countries
in the world4.
Through extensive information sources on the various conflicts and data collected
by agencies in Cambodia, an informed picture of the extent of ERW contamination is
possible. This study is merely an introduction to the possibilities of information and
knowledge that can be derived from an extensive analysis of Cambodia’s rich data
environment.
Origins and nature of ERW contamination in Cambodia
National and regional armed forces engaged in a series of deadly conventional
and guerrilla warfare styled conflicts starting mid-century and eventually ending in civil
war spanning a twenty-year period chronologically as follows;
a. 1939-1945 - World War II,
b. 1946- 1954 - French Indochina War,
c. 1956-1975 - Vietnam War,
d. 1975-1979 - Khmer Rouge Regime,
e. 1979-1992 - Civil War, Insurgency Warfare and Factional fighting
between VN Forces, CPAF, KPNLAF, ANKI and NADK5, and
f. 1994-1998 - Civil War between RGC and Khmer Rouge remnants.
Resulting extended conflicts fuelled by massive use of munitions from
Communist Bloc, and Western sources, combined with locally produced or improvised
weapons and munitions created an unparalleled potpourri of explosive contamination.
Unique to the region is Cambodia’s high level of landmine contamination.
Combatants used this persistent weapon to isolate conflict areas and populations with
barriers of mines. Cambodia also suffered from massive aerial bombardment during the
Vietnam War contaminating large areas with an enormous amount of unexploded air
dropped ordnance (Shawcross, 2002).
During these protracted conflicts warring factions abandoned munitions on the
battlefields or in caches extending all over Cambodia. Smaller munitions caches
abandoned on former battlefields are routinely found by mine clearance agencies and
scrap collectors. Additionally, unused munitions from these conflicts sit deteriorating in
dilapidated military stockpiles throughout the country. All these munitions pose a danger
to communities and remain accessible to whoever locates them first notably the growing
scrap metal collection industry. Apart from munitions are the weapons themselves. The
4

ERW includes all forms and types of munitions left behind in a post-conflict environment whether,
unexploded or abandoned are categorised ERW according to the UN CCW Protocol V November 2003.
5
Vietnam (VN) forces formed the Cambodia Peoples Armed Forces (CPAF), whom jointly fought a
protracted war against the Khmer Peoples National Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF), Army National
Kampuchea Independent (ANKI) and National Army Democratic Kampuchea (NADK) commonly known
as the Khmer Rouge (KR).
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entire country armed itself during each of the conflicts with uncontrolled weapon
distribution.
Human security of the general population continues to be adversely affected by
ERW, particularly as land pressure increases as people move seeking livelihoods on land
in former battlefields and minefields. The close proximity of hazardous areas to the
population negatively affects the socio-economic structure of society. ERW impact is
persistent forcing the population to either wait for mine action agencies to create space
for living or accept personal risk entering hazard areas without assistance bearing the
consequences to survive.
The majority of ERW contamination in Cambodia results from several distinct
periods in the country’s recent history. From the mid 1960’s until 1973, the south, central
and northeast provinces were pounded by US, South Vietnamese and Cambodian air
forces intent on cutting North Vietnamese supply routes into southern Vietnam. As these
campaigns ended, the Khmer Rouge stepped up their offensive against the Lon Nol
Government. During this period, an extensive aerial bombardment campaign supported
the Lon Nol Government as the Khmer Rouge forces closed on the capital. In 1975,
having successfully routed the Cambodian Army from the southern, central and eastern
provinces, the Khmer Rouge finally overran the capital, Phnom Penh and assumed
control of the country.
Cessation of fighting was relatively short-lived. In response to repeated Khmer
Rouge incursions into Vietnam and the unfolding humanitarian crisis brought about by
Pol Pot’s return to year zero, Hanôi acted in 1979 and launched a major offensive into
eastern Cambodia. Overwhelmed by the speed and size of the offensive, the Khmer
Rouge fled to the northwest corner of the country. Support by the Thai military, western
countries and other Khmer factions such as KPNLAF and ANKI, a Cambodian resistance
conducted a protracted guerrilla war against the Vietnamese Army and CPAF. Over the
next 15 years a cycle of dry season offensives against the Vietnamese and CPAF
continued until the early 1990’s, and later a sporadic civil war between the RCAF and
Khmer Rouge continued until 1998.
Starting in the early 1980s onwards, both Vietnamese and Cambodian militaries
laid extensive landmine defences along much of the northwest Thai-Cambodian border.
Known as the K5 mine belt, these defences constitute more or less a continuous field of
mines running for approximately 700 kilometres. Further mine defences were also laid, as
combatants from both sides retreated to secure ground following each dry season
offensive. These sporadic and often overlapping mined areas spread across much of the
country including extensive mine laying on infrastructure such as bridges and culverts.
The concentration of mines is primarily in Pursat, Pailin Battambang and Banteay
Meanchey, Odder Meanchey and Siem Reap provinces.
Scope of ERW contamination in Cambodia
Along with mine contamination, years of successive dry season offensives in the
northwest and earlier periods of intense fighting during the rise of the Khmer Rouge,
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have left vast areas of the country littered with all types of explosive remnants of war.
The extent of this contamination is witnessed thru CMAC mine clearance and EOD
operations west of Phnom Penh. This area has an extreme level of contamination, where
on average CMAC encounters 30.6 abandoned ordnance (AO) or unexploded ordnance
(UXO) items per hectare in Kandal and Kompong Speu provinces, the majority of which
dates from Lon Nol times.
Similar operations have found averages of 7-9 items per hectare (numbers exclude
munitions caches). The average number of AO/UXO found during all CMAC clearance
operations is just over 18 items per hectare. Since 1993, CMAC has destroyed more than
850,000 items of ordnance; 630,378 by EOD teams and 223,077 during clearance
operations (CMAC, 2006).
The other remaining form of ERW contamination is air dropped ordnance
resulting from US bombing of Cambodia during the early years of the Vietnam War, and
later, in support of Lon Nol forces engaged against the Khmer Rouge. Between June
1965 and August 1973, the South Asia Command launched 115,274 combat sorties
against targets in the lower east, central and northeast regions of Cambodia. Several
thousands of these were B52 and B57 strikes involving more than a million tons of
general-purpose bombs (ranging from 500lb to 1,000 lb). A further 9,500 sorties
comprised tactical air strikes, carrying up to 87,000 cluster bomb units6. Average
payloads for these bombs were as high as 2100 individual bomb units (bomblets) per
canister.
A USAF study designed to assess amounts of explosive placed within reach of
enemy forces due to malfunctioning air ordnance (Study and Evaluation of Counter Mine
Activities, SECMA, 1968) estimated that 5 percent of general-purpose bombs and up to
20 percent of cluster munitions may have failed to detonate as designed. This translates to
potentially 50,000 tons of unexploded general-purpose bombs and 3.75 million
unexploded cluster bomblets. All of these areas are now openly accessible to the
Cambodian population exposing people to the hazardous explosive material.

ERW Data Sources
Over time, mine action organizations collected survey data with very different
missions and mandates, these data sources range in quality from anecdotal experiences to

6

South East Asia Air Sortie Database (SEADAB) provides a highly useful but incomplete record of air
operations conducted inside Cambodia. Although SEADAB records various attributes of 115,274
bombing missions and tactical air strikes conducted by the UASF South Asia Command in Cambodia
from 1965 to 1973, 9,282 of these entries however have no location data. Equally, it does not record any
missions by the South Vietnamese Air Force in eastern Cambodia or air operations of the Royal Thai Air
Force in western Cambodia. It is also widely believed that USAF records for other areas of operations
were deliberately falsified to conceal bombing activities conducted in eastern Cambodia, west of the
permissible “Freedom Zone”.
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Level One Impact Survey (L1S) data7. Consequently, Cambodia has a diverse array of
reasonable quality data, available for both strategic and operational planning. A holistic
description of the Cambodia’s ERW contamination has simply not been collated by any
one organization. The seemingly intractable problem of determining the size and scope of
the ERW problem can be resolved with minimal resources and inter-agency cooperation.
Therefore, an understanding of existing survey information accuracy and its influence on
national strategy and operational planning is crucial to finding solutions.
CMAC under UNTAC developed the first mine information database recording
mined areas locations in preparation for the deployment of UN peacekeepers and
electoral staff. The UNTAC Mine Liaison Team collected minefield tactical information
from the three combatant factions CPAF, KPNLAF, and ANKI during 1992-1993.
Unfortunately, the NADK never cooperated in this process until the collapse of the
Khmer Rouge in 1998. These initial steps were supplemented by various agencies
creating data for specific program needs such as the UNHCR rapid mine survey,
conducted by HALO Trust of four northwest provinces in preparation for the 1992-93
refugee repatriation.
Important to note is the collation, and analysis of these two data sets (HALO
Trust survey & UNTAC Mine Liaison Team factional mine information) into one mine
data set with registered serialised/coded mine contaminated areas. This data set became
the CMAC Mine Database used for the deployment of UNTAC to support the elections
and eventually the national mine action database until the L1S and formation of CMAA.
During 1996-1998 period, CMAC conducted a limited mined area verification
program in a few provinces visiting reported mined areas to determine information
accuracy. Little documentation exists of this survey’s results and consequently its
accuracy was questioned due to limited training and quality control measures exercised in
this project8.
At the conclusion of hostilities in 1998 with the former Khmer Rouge faction,
CMAC conducted a rapid survey of the previously inaccessible regions of Pailin, and
Anlong Veng. This data was added to the existing spatial database completing what is
now called the “CMAC Database and in some cases the CMAC survey”9.
Culminating this ad hoc survey history, was the recognition for a comprehensive
study of Cambodia thru a “National Level One Impact Survey (L1S)” to determine the
extent of the socio-economic impacts caused by landmines and unexploded ordnance.
The L1S was completed in 2002 by Geospatial supported by funded by CIDA
(Geospatial, 2002).
During the late 1990’s Handicap International Belgium (HIB) supported a
Cambodian Red Cross project to carry out a comprehensive victim survey at village level.
7

Strong controversy exists whether the Geospatial survey complies with UN survey protocols. For the
purposes of this report, the Geospatial survey is a Level One Survey (L1S).
8
This survey became part of an information verification process confirming factional mine data handed
over to the UNTAC Mine Liaison Team in 1992-93.
9
Notable that CMAC conducted a number of information gathering projects that serviced operational
needs. None, of these surveys are conclusive in of themselves, hence the requirement to conduct a L1S.
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The information collected is publicly available in the Cambodian Mine Victim
Information System (CMVIS) database (CMVIS, 2004). Volunteers in a countrywide
network continuously collect victim information. CMVIS is considered the most accurate
depiction locating where mines and uxo directly impact communities as evidenced by
casualties. Monthly and annual reports are accessible through the CMVIS website and
distributed in hard copy; National victim results leading up to January 2006 are depicted
graph below.
Figure 1 - Mines/UXO Victims in Cambodia
Mines/UXO Victims in Cambodia
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Mine action programs have contributed positively to the reduction of casualties in
Cambodia starting in 1998 at 2,053 victims and reaching a consistent level of victims in
the last six years of approx 800+ victims to 200510.
In recent years, International NGO mine action operators MAG, and HALO Trust
have added their survey and clearance information to the CMAA database. The deposits
of L1S, CMVIS, CMAC and NGO data represents the best possible picture of the
mine/uxo situation and impact on Cambodia’s population. However, owing to a lack of
trained Cambodian staff and resources, the existing data has not been fully exploited by
thorough examination, collation and analysis. These various surveys can be described as
data pools, which have not been integrated into a common data set and developed into
information for analysis.

10

Statistics retrieved from the Cambodia Red Cross website, as of January 2006.
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A summary of the available information is listed in Table 1 see below.
Table 1 - Summary of Survey & Data Sources Available in Cambodia
Survey/Data Collection

Timeframe

Collated w/
Existing Data

Analyses &
Verification

Availability

UNTAC Mine Liaison
Team Survey

1992-93

Yes

No

CMAC

HALO Trust Survey

1992-93

Yes

Yes

UNHCR – HALO CMAC

1992-2006

Only UNTAC and
HALO data

yes

CMAC

1996-97

Only UNTAC and
HALO data

Yes

CMAC

CMAC Survey Pailin &
Anlong Veng

1998-1999

Yes

Yes

CMAC

MAG & HALO
Databases

1998-2006

No

Local Operational
Area

MAG & HALO

SEADAB

1965-73

No

No

USG – USAFCMAC

FANK

1970-73

No

No

USG - CMAA

CMVIS

2000-2006

No

No

CRC-HI-CMAA

2002

No

No

CIDA- GeospatialCMAA

CMAC Mine Database
CMAC Verification
Survey

Level 1 Impact Survey

Data available on ERW contamination does not end with this table other sources
are now available in US Government archives. The CMAA GIS Database Technical
Advisor has researched and located an extensive source of ground and air combat records
that must be acquired for analysis (Thomas, 2003). To reach a comprehensive
understanding of the ERW contamination facing Cambodia collation and analysis of
these data pools is fundamental.
Organizational Capacity of ERW Response in Cambodia
In recent years, both national and international ERW service providers have added
value to the sector. The mine action sector has matured allowing opportunity to reflect on
achievements and explore groundbreaking innovations that will deliver ERW services
better, faster and safer for national needs.
The sector development cycle has realised introduction and equipping of a full
toolbox of resources. These recently introduced resources (mechanical assistance and
explosive detection dogs) have not reached their full optimization to deliver high
productivity, which eventually will dramatically change strategic outcomes in Cambodia.
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The structure of complementary national and international organizations is
fundamental to the success of the mine action sector and will be the basis for evolution
into an ERW Response capacity. Therefore, a baseline understanding and stock taking of
various organizations involved with ERW is necessary to determine where gaps exist and
needs requirements for the future.
National ERW Service Providers
Council of Ministers (COM)
Prime Minister Hun Sen chairs the Council of Ministers (COM) as the
authoritative body consisting of major ministerial representatives overseeing all mine
action activities in Cambodia (RGC, 2000). The COM has two deputy prime ministers
(vice-chairmen) with a varying number of ministers acting as an executive group. The
COM directly administers the CMAA whose Director is the COM Secretary-General
reporting to the Chairman.
The cross cutting nature of the ERW sector requires the capacity to interact with
government at the inter-ministerial level. Through the COM the mine action sector has
unique access and a regular venue for placing issues on the RGC agenda enabling the
rapid promotion of mine action legislation developing the sector. The direct access
arrangement is positive for implementing change and introduction of policies that will
create an environment for ERW programs and plans to reach fruition.

Cambodia Mine Action Authority (CMAA)
CMAA was created to strike a balance between implementing agencies and a
governmental body that could regulate the mine action sector without conflicting
interests. Since inception, CMAA’s main activity has been passing legislation
establishing its primacy in the mine action sector (RGC, 2000).
In 2004, RGC passed a sub-decree on the Socio-Economic Management of Mine
Clearance Operations (RGC, 2004). This decree effectively empowers CMAA and
provincial authorities to direct the allocation of mine action resources, ostensibly thru the
Mine Action Planning Units (MAPU) and Provincial Mine Action Committee (PMAC).
The MAPU/PMAC are established in five north-west provinces/municipalities of
(Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, Otdar Meanchey, Preah Vihear & Pailin).
Additionally, CMAA has established the framework for national standards receiving
RGC approval for the first component of the Cambodian Mine Action Standards (CMAS)
in 2005 (RGC, 2005a).
After initially establishing its mandate and role, CMAA began setting out its
national strategy in a Five Year Mine Action Plan (FYMAP) for 2003-2007, now
superseded by a rolling strategic plan FYMAP 2005-2009 presented by CMAA in late
2004. The two key CMAA milestones reviewed in this study are, clearing high priority
minefields by 2015, and Cambodia becoming “impact free” by the year 2020 (CMAA,
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2005). CMAA refers to its strategic plan and a “rolling” document subject to change and
review on an annual basis. This is a beneficial policy for creating a flexible environment
for change to introduce the “End State Programming” required for a transitional shift
towards an ERW Response community.
In 2005, CMAA’s mandate has been revised to reflect its expanding roles and
responsibilities (RGC, 2005). These changes enhance CMAA governance capacity for the
mine action sector and provide a good foundation for a shift towards National ERW
Response. Additionally, the CMAA departments are reduced to five and more
responsibilities are delegated to Deputy Secretary-Generals in their functional areas.
CMAA is able to function through a government budget and donor contributions to the
UNDP Trust Fund.

Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC)
CMAC was formed in 1992 as part of the United Nations Advanced Mission in
Cambodia (UNAMIC) as the authoritative body to oversee all Cambodian mine action
operations11. Simultaneously, the Mine Clearance Training Unit (MCTU) was formed to
train and field demining teams in support of UNTAC forces assisting UN sponsored
national elections. In late 1993, MCTU merged into CMAC, which became the focal
point for all mine action in Cambodia until 2001. The Royal Decree NS/RKT/0801/264
(dated 8 August 2001) revised the legal status of the CMAC and established it as “a
national institution to provide mine action services for humanitarian and development
projects”. These services included developing national policies on mine action.
CMAC is the national mine action service provider. Today, CMAC provides a full
range of national mine action services including survey, clearance, explosive ordnance
disposal, mine risk education, database, training and management. CMAC priorities as
outlined in the Royal decree are as follows:
a. Humanitarian purposes in high casualty areas;
b. Economic purposes for the expansion of agriculture, rehabilitation,
national reconstruction or development projects.
In 1999, CMAC suffered a crisis of confidence amongst the donor community
over the use and allocation of land, demined by CMAC. This crisis resulted in reforms to
the mine action sector, accelerating the formation of CMAA to assume all policy issues
and changing CMAC into a purely operational mine action service provider. (RGC,
2000).
As a consequence of the donor confidence shake up the net mine clearance
capacity of CMAC’s seventy-nine (79) platoons were reduced to forty-nine (49) platoons,
laying off scores of deminers. The donor exodus shock traumatized CMAC affecting its
ability to change or innovate without clear and direct guidance from the international
community. CMAC has since implemented reforms in compliance with the donor
11

Until the formation of CMAA regulating CMAC to a national mine action service provider in 2001.
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community guidance and recovered from this organizational catastrophe with renewed
donor support.
The donor community has invested in CMAC complimenting its manual
demining teams with explosive detection dogs, and mechanical brush cutters. Today,
CMAC has a tremendous toolbox capacity available for operations. The prime clearance
resources are supported by skilled teams such as mine risk education teams (MRE),
technical survey teams (TST), explosive ordnance disposal teams (EOD), and community
based mine or uxo risk reduction (CBMRR & CBURR) networks.
Funding for CMAC operations by donors has formally been through the UNDP
Trust Fund. Recently donors contribute directly to CMAC through bi-lateral mechanisms.
CMAC staff is able to solicit the bulk of its operational requirements through bi-lateral
mechanisms with the governments Japan, USA, Netherlands, Germany and Australia.

RCAF
Military factions from the CPAF, KPNLAF, ANKI and NADK have been merged
together to form the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF). Initially this
transformation took place under the guidance of UNTAC at the end of the peacekeeping
mission. Following the collapse of the Khmer Rouge political structure, NADK
disintegration, and RCAF military pressure the Khmer Rouge joined the RGC in 1998.
During the UNTAC period, the various factions were tasked to clear up landmines
in their respective areas of control. Most of the factions acted with reservation upon this
request; however, some CPAF units actively removed mines experiencing heavy
casualties. These operations were cut short to avoid undue loss of life without proper
training and equipment.
The MCTU teams created during the UNTAC period were in fact soldiers from
all factions except the Khmer Rouge. Eventually, these teams were demobilized after
UNTAC’s departure forming the core of CMAC’s demining teams. This unofficial
demobilization has been the only successful Disarming, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process in Cambodia.
While, CMAC was absorbing demobilized soldiers, RCAF was assuming a
national responsibility for security and defence of the nation, which included some
responsibilities towards clearing mines and uxo. RCAF evolved during this period
conducting tactical demining operations in support of war fighting operations against the
Khmer Rouge. The US Department of Defense (USDOD) supported training and
equipping of an RCAF Engineer Battalion with mine clearance capability. This technical
and logistical support was removed following the political instability during 1997. Since,
this time the RCAF Engineer Battalion capacity no longer exists, its soldiers and
resources dispersed throughout RCAF structure.
Recent, RCAF operational reports to the Council of Ministers claimed enormous
achievements clearing land and removing mines/uxo. RCAF claims supporting
infrastructure and facility construction projects with mine clearance operations
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throughout the country (RCAF, 2003). In these operations, RCAF claimed clearance of
ninety-seven (97) square kilometres of land since 1992. CMAA and other mine action
agencies requested RCAF to substantiate these statistics. RCAF has not been able to
provide clearance reports or operational records as evidence of their operations.
In recent years, the World Bank and Asia Development Bank (ADB) provided
repayable loans to the RGC to facilitate rebuilding major roads and some secondary
routes. Loans are transferred to Ministries various ministries responsible for
development. Mine clearance projects are then directly sub-contracted to RCAF.
In 2005, the Prime Minister ordered RCAF to clear rural roads as part of its mine
action mandate12. The most recent operations started in July 2005 with RCAF deploying
demining teams to Siem Reap, Bantey Meanchey, Oddar Meanchey and Battambang
provinces. RCAF’s now defines its mine action role as clearance for infrastructure and
development projects, such as rural road construction. During this study RCAF was
tasked by COM to prepare clearance plans for the rail lines leading from Sisophon to the
Thai border and Takeo to the Vietnamese border.
In a separate initiative, the RGC successfully lobbied the United Nations to
include RCAF as part of peacekeeping forces. The UN responded by offering United
Nations Military Observer (UNMO) positions to RGC on its missions. Supporting this
initiative the Australian Defence Force trained a number of Cambodian UNMO’s for
deployment on UN missions, where recently RCAF officers have been posted to Sudan.
Most recently, the UN requested the RGC to provide a 135-man Military
Demining Unit for the peacekeeping mission in the Sudan. RGC responded equipping
and training a RCAF Demining Unit of company strength meeting stringent International
Mine Action Standard (IMAS) requirements and deploying in February 2006 to the
Sudan13.
National Police
The National Police has been working together with mine action service providers
at the local level since 1992. These arrangements have mostly been security related
although included direct liaison for clearance operations and information sharing.
The National Police are the main component of the European Union Small Arms
and light Weapons (SALW) reduction program. This project offered local people the
opportunity to obtain development funding for their village in exchange for handing over
weapons to the authorities (Sinthay, 2003). The police network is an integral part of
SALW project and likewise has recognised as a potential valuable asset to the CMBRR
program.
The National Police appointed a representative for CMAA in September 2005 as
part of their interests in joining the mine action sector. At the time of this assessment, the
12

Statement by MGEN Sem Sovanny referring to his mandate for RCAF Engineering Branch
responsibilities.
13
Study team witnessed final preparations of RCAF Demining Unit deployment for the Sudan
Peacekeeping mission at Odong RCAF Engineer School.
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national police role in mine action is increasing joining the CBMRR information network
in collaborative operations with CMAC and enforcing the law as outlined in the Law on
the Management of Weapons, Explosives and Ammunition (RGC, 2005b).
Institutionally the National Police are well suited for contributing to the mine
action sector. The National Police are present in every commune with a communication
network extending through district, provincial and national levels.
The capacity for the National Police to reach every mine or uxo affected
commune is already in place. CMAC has capitalised on the police infrastructure through
the CBMRR volunteer representatives to support its community-based mine risk
reduction strategy (CMAC, 2002). The expansion of CMAC’s successful CBMRR
mine/uxo information gathering networks naturally include the National Police. In
November 2005, CMAC provided mine risk education training to 182 police officers so
that they can be included into the CMBRR program.
The CMAC and NGO experience of working with the national police is positive.
Formalizing this relationship is in the best interest of the ERW sector as a whole. The
National Police have proven to bring good value to the information and prioritization
process. Developing a consistent reporting system that includes the national police would
multiply the positive impact.
After several consultation sessions with the National Police, the study team
observed a specific interest in developing EOD services, such as a “Bomb Squad”
capacity for traditional police roles. Later, at the conclusion of the study the National
Police presented a pilot project vetted through the Ministry of Interior to develop a
National Police EOD response capability. This pilot project intends to train, equip and
deploy National Police EOD teams into five provinces. This proposal will be presented to
a Chinese government delegation visiting Cambodia in April 2006 as a request for bilateral support.

National Commercial Companies
The presence of national commercial companies is the subject of considerable
discussion in the mine action community. This study was not able to pursue the shadowy
nature of this unofficial sector. All inquiries meet silence at national coordination
meeting on the nature, composition and authority in which commercial companies
operate in Cambodia. Rumours abound that at least fifteen (15) commercial companies
have received provisional licences from the CMAA for operating in Cambodia,
renewable every six-months.
The recent UNDP “Clearing for Results” program, which has a quality assurance
capacity-building component, may be the instrument that brings this underground
component of the mine action sector out of the closet.
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International ERW Service Providers
United Nations
The UNAMIC mission in Cambodia had the foresight to set up CMAC as a focal
point to undertake mine action activities. UNTAC carried this concept forward to support
the electoral process during its mandate. At that time, CMAC technical advisors
attempted to find a United Nations body that could host the development of CMAC.
UNHCR took up CMAC’s request to support refugee repatriation from Thailand for a
finite period 1992-93.
Post UNTAC withdrawal of peacekeeping forces, Handicap International
Belgium sponsored CMAC to ensure it did not collapse. CMAC technical advisors
managed to obtain 20 million USD in donor contributions to sustain CMAC mine action
operations. It was at this time UNDP became interested in Mine Action and organized the
UNDP Trust Fund under their management for CMAC in mid 1994. Since this period,
UNDP has been responsible for the development of CMAC as the national institution to
execute mine action in Cambodia. Owing to the aforementioned crisis in 1999-2000,
CMAC reorganized to meet the demands of the donor community.
As CMAC developed into a nationally managed organization, UNDP adjusted its
support to other priorities and such as CMAA development. Most recently, UNDP has
created the “Clearance for Results” program initiated in early 2006.
World Bank & Asia Development Bank
The World Bank and Asia Development Bank (ADB) provide grants and loans to
the RGC for a full range of development programs such as water management and road
building. Loans are deposited into RGC ministry accounts after which development
projects are competitively bid in public process. At this time, contracts for development
demining have only been received by RCAF no other known bids have been awarded.
A recent ADB Partnership Fund deposited a thirty (30) million USD loan for rural
road development in northwest Cambodia is having a direct impact on the mine action
sector. Two million USD were allocated for mine clearance support to rural road
construction projects and eventually awarded to RCAF through the Ministry of Rural
Development.
It’s noteworthy to understand that these contracts are awarded, without any
known mine/uxo clearance standards or contractual obligations for safety. Based upon a
slow legislative environment where the first five sections of the CMAS have only
recently been issued this situation is not healthy for professional level management of the
sector. Potentially this unstructured environment without standards and guidelines sets
precedence for unsafe practices affecting the Cambodian population.
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European Commission (EC)
The EC initiated the national regulatory concept developing and funded CMAA’s
implementation as part of the mine action sector reform. The EC has left the development
of the CMAA to UNDP and diverted its assistance efforts on international mine action
NGO’s and support to the Small Arms and Light Weapons reduction programs in
Cambodia.
Most recently as of 24 February 2006, the EC has announced a five-year
assistance package for mine action in Cambodia. This initiative has not been fully
investigated by the study team, however initial review of EC documentation indicates this
contribution was developed in 2001-2002 and may in fact not reflect the dynamic
changes and needs of the mine action sector in 2006 and beyond.

International NGO’s
Handicap International Belgium (HIB)
HIB is a leading supporter in the mine action community and joined CMAC early
in its development. HIB provided direct support services technical advisors at CMAC HQ
and other Demining Units until 2000. Additionally, HIB contributed to the development
of CMAC’s by training and deploying Demining Unit #4. HIB development policy is to
integrate and hand over all program resources to the host nation authorities within a
reasonable development timeframe. All HIB/CMAC developed resources were handed
over to national responsibility since 2000.
HIB has participated in several interesting studies on informal village demining
and scrap metal collection (Bottomley, 2003). HIB is renowned for its development of
the CMVIS program with the Cambodian Red Cross. Mine action stakeholders use the
CMVIS as the main tool for prioritizing operations. HIB is currently reviewing the
CMVIS program with a view to fully hand over to the Cambodian Red Cross.

Norwegian Peoples Aid
NPA began its mine action operations in northwest Cambodia developing several
demining platoons in Bantay Meanchey Province. These teams were handed over to
CMAC in early 1994, after which NPA continued to support national mine action
development with technical advisory positions in CMAC HQ.
Today, NPA continues to directly support CMAC with Mine Detection Dog
(MDD) and operational management technical advisors for the MDD program. This
program is expanding the number of MDD teams supplied to CMAC. NPA is
experimenting with long leash dogs and a uxo detection dog program.
NPA has developed an internal quality assurance process in Demining Unit #1,
which has empowered local managers to define problems and create home-grown
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solutions. Demining Unit staffs have taken ownership of the internal quality assurance
accepting this method of working. NPA may extend this program with Japanese
Government funding approval to support DU #2, DU#4 and DU#5.
Also, NPA is most noted for its continued technical advisory support to CMAC in
the form of innovative studies that have resulted in successful programs such as the
community based mine risk reduction program. NPA has received the blessing of the
mine action community and CMAA to initiate this National ERW Response Study.

Hazardous Area Life Support Organization (HALO)
HALO Trust started it mine action activities in Cambodia conducting the first
survey in 1993 of the four northwest provinces. HALO Trust continues to conduct mine
clearance operations in northwest Cambodia. HALO uses CMVIS reports to focus its
demining operations primarily working in high-risk casualty causing areas along the K5
mine barrier. HALO works with the PMAC/MAPU process when their priorities match
CMVIS data and HALO needs assessment criteria.
HALO Trust has actively recorded the results of land reclamation in their areas of
operation (Boulter, 2005). This has led to targeted deployments of their survey, clearance,
and EOD teams into highly productive operations. The HALO Trust country
representative is working with the CMAA, and CMAC actively promoting the
recognition of area reduction by informal village demining and land reclamation.
HALO is very active supporting a working group to determine how land can be
re-categorized from suspected mined areas to productive land after cultivation. This
initiative will have a long-term impact on the direction of mine action operations in
Cambodia.

Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
MAG continues to provide innovative mine action services using integrated multiskilled teams. MAG primarily targets high impact areas providing the full range of mine
action services in well thought out operations creating the greatest benefit to recipients.
MAG uses CMVIS information collated with localized technical survey confirming the
target areas on the ground ensuring maximum impact of every operation. MAG actively
participates with the PMAC/MAPU process; however only deploy their mine clearance
assets on meaningful tasks.
MAG uses mechanical assistance in their operations, and recently started using
mine detection dog teams provided by CMAC. Initial reports from MAG are positive
with claims of increased productivity amongst MDD supported teams.
MAG delivers mine action services for humanitarian and development priorities,
servicing the wider assistance community in their areas of operations. The small multiskilled team compositions allow rapid deployment to remote areas, servicing the
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requirements of development agencies. MAG is a supportive and active participant in
Cambodia’s national mine action development.
Japan Mine Action Service (JMAS)
JMAS is active providing managerial, financial and technical support for six (6)
CMAC EOD teams in central and eastern Cambodia. JMAS receives funding from the
Japanese government for operational costs of CMAC EOD teams and provides three (3)
EOD technical advisors to follow CMAC EOD teams. The JMAS project support started
in 2002 with two EOD teams incrementally rising to six teams operating in Prey Vieng,
Svay Rieng and Kandal provinces in 2004.
Retired Japanese Defense Force EOD experts, provide the technical advisory
support CMAC EOD teams. JMAS program has added the community based unexploded
ordnance risk reduction (CBURR) network to its operations. Initial results of the CBURR
network are positive freeing up EOD teams to react to uxo reports rather than looking for
uxo themselves. This network is based on the same principles as the CBMRR network
used effectively in northwest Cambodia.
JMAS intends to continue operations in three provinces and expand the number of
teams it supports depending on donor support.
Golden West Foundation
Golden West Foundation is developing a Explosive Harvesting & Recast System
in collaboration with the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC). This systems purpose
is recovery of valuable explosive materials which can be re-used in mine clearance and
EOD operations by national service providers and NGO’s in Cambodia (CMAC, 2005).
The project is supported by US Department of Defense Humanitarian Demining
Directorate research & development program. Starting in 2005 this experimental program
has set up operations co-located with the CMAC Training Center in Kompong Chnang
and begun developing special charges for demining and EOD operations.
The project has successfully recovered explosives from munitions provided by the
RCAF, CMAC and NGO’s. These explosives have been recast into special shaped
charges and issued to operators in an ongoing field trial starting in January 2006. To date,
thirty-six different special shaped charges have been designed and produced for trial and
operations (Hess, 2005). The potential of this project to address the pressing shortage of
high grade explosives is significant. Affordable high grade explosive is mandatory for
successful mine action and future ERW Response operations in Cambodia.
Australia Volunteers International (AVI)
Australian Volunteers International (AVI) is currently implementing the Capacity
Building in Mine Action Planning Project, with support from AusAID. AVI provides
27

technical advisory services developing national governance of mine action through the
CMAA and Mine Action Planning Unit (MAPU) and Provincial Mine Action
Committees (PMAC) in five northwest provinces. This NGO posts volunteers in each
province to train, advise, and help formulate mine action priorities. This program enables
better decision-making process from the commune to Provincial level. The capacity of
decision makers is improving through the intervention of AVI support to MAPU/PMAC
organizations and national staff14. AVI approach to directly working with government
authorities developing national ownership of the ERW problem and creating capacity for
good governance of the sector is unique amongst the international service providers.
PMAC/MAPU process developing provincial and municipal level governance of
the mine action sector is progressing. Appropriate priorities for mine clearance are
planned for community development and coordinated amongst local government offices
for those areas in need. Mine action service providers generally support this process, as it
develops. As the MAPU/PMAC process develops strength, mine action service providers
will use this mechanism as a preferred method to long-standing methodologies working
without good governance in place.
CMAC on the other hand undertakes MAPU/PMAC these tasks as priority in their
role as national service provider. As a result, CMAC is routinely questioned by program
monitors on the allocation of demining teams working in low priority areas according to
CMVIS and L1S data. These questions relate to the use of demining teams in areas that
do not synchronise with CMAC/CMAA mandates, national strategy and plans. In this
respect, the connection between the Provincial level and National level (CMAA) is a
rubber stamp process, which does not necessarily follow the goals or objectives of
national plans or strategies.
Another key aspect of the AVI project is to improve information management and
knowledge of databases thru the use of GIS. This capacity building is very valuable at the
provincial/municipal level. The completion of the information/knowledge cycle also
requires development at the national level where AVI is starting technical advisory
support.
Linking governance development at the Provincial level with the national
responsibilities of CMAA and improving the information/knowledge that integrates all
mine action activities is the next level of capacity building challenge. The AVI Capacity
Building in Mine Action Planning Project is providing valuable good governance
development of the mine action sector and has high potential to continue it work
developing sovereign ownership in National ERW response.

14

Correspondence with Scott Rankin and Andy Kervell April 2006, updating AVI programs and plans for
future capacity building development in the mine action sector.
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International Commercial
BACTEC
BACTEC is an accredited EOD/UXO company with the Australian Government
Defence UXO Panel (DUXOP) and carries out work in SE Asia15. Starting in January
2006, UNDP contracted BACTEC to develop CMAA capacity for conducting national
quality assurance monitoring as part of the “Clearing for Results” program.
Geospatial
Geospatial a Canadian commercial company contracted by the Government of
Canada to support geographic information system (GIS) services for Cambodia.
Geospatial and AVI have worked together to supporting the development of the
MAPU/PMAC decision-making process.
Although the Canadian government continues to support mine action programs in
Cambodia through Geospatial, recently funds supporting three (3) MAPU’s are directed
thru the ADMAC Project. Geospatial continues supporting MAPU process indirectly
while concentrating on other land titling related issues. Coordination and integration of
Geospatial resources into a comprehensive development plan could have a positive effect
on information management, operational prioritization and strategic outcomes in
Cambodia.
QASIA
QAsia is a local company based in Cambodia conducting a quality assurance
monitoring project for the US Department of State in its assistance program for mine
action in Cambodia16. Primarily, QAsia has been contracted to conduct external quality
control monitoring of US PM/WRA support to CMAC Demining Unit (DU) #3 in Pailin.
QAsia also sells various types of mine clearance and EOD equipment to operators in
Cambodia.
EOD & BAC Operations in Cambodia
Ostensibly, all programs in Cambodia have been “mine centric” in nature
focusing for very good reason on the impact of landmines. This study investigative
process focused on EOD and Battle Area Clearance (BAC) operations. However,
investigation of EOD/BAC operations cannot be achieved without a holistic analysis of
existing mine action operations.
15
16

Sourced through BACTEC website at http://www.bactec.com/asia/index.htm
Sourced through QAsia website at http://www.qasia-solutions.com/pailinproject.html
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Initial UNAMIC plans for the UN mission in Cambodia included the requirement
for mine clearance operations however, did not make provisions for developing an EOD
capacity. This oversight was addressed through ad hoc measures stretching existing mine
clearance budgets to develop the first EOD training and teams in mid 1993 by MCTU.
Dutch and Belgian EOD Technical Advisors trained a total of five (5) basic EOD
courses until late 1998. In 1999, the first advanced EOD course was taught raising the
level of Cambodian EOD expertise. As far as it is known, no more basic and/or advanced
EOD courses have been offered since the departure of Dutch and Belgian EOD Technical
Advisors in 2000 and 2004 respectively (Fiers, 2006).
Cambodian EOD teams and management received the highest ratio of technical
advisory support of all components of CMAC on a continuous basis from 1993 til 2004.
The result of this dedicated capacity development is Cambodian EOD teams operating
almost entirely independently in successful operations all over the country.
Battle Area Clearance (BAC) is nominally listed as a function for mine clearance
teams to utilize under certain threat conditions. All operators in Cambodia have engaged
in limited BAC operations where essentially a mine clearance team has been diverted to
deal with an area of reasonably high ordnance contamination and lacking a mine threat.
These operations are normally reported as mine clearance operations aggregated into
standard reports at organizational level and national level reports to CMAA.
All organizations has provisional BAC SOP’s that reflect minor changes from
mine clearance SOP’s and are equipped a limited number of large-loop and depth search
detectors to enable these operations as required.
Operational & Technical Capacity
EOD operations have been highly successful since inception. The productivity of
this small group of skilled operators has effectively removed at least two thirds of all
ordnance located in Cambodia. CMAC and MAG have deployed varying numbers of
EOD teams throughout the country for several years; with The Halo Trust following suite
in 2003. Since then, the three operators have completed some 28,135 EOD tasks between
them, destroying almost 440,000 items of ordnance in the past three year alone.
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Figure 2 - EOD Outputs for 2003-2005
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Note * Aggregated figures for CMAC, HALO TRUST & MAG, calculated over the past three years where
all three operators statistics and record keeping were equal.

Due to the magnitude and level of threat posed by mine contamination in
Cambodia, mine clearance operations have understandably taken priority over EOD.
EOD operations has, and continues to be treated primarily as an ancillary service. Over
the years however, operators recognized the need for a dedicated capability; one that was
able to respond to random requests and deal with a wide range of the both land and air
service munitions.
EOD teams are most commonly deployed on the basis of CMVIS casualty
statistics; matched where possible, against each operators’ own survey findings (technical
or village surveying), L1S data and USAF bombing records. Within these targeted areas,
teams often operate according to a set work plan, moving progressively from village to
village or commune to commune, and responding to emergency tasks as they arise.
These tasks are generally requested through a range of channels, including direct
approaches by villagers to the teams themselves or contact with their respective regional
headquarters. EOD response requests are also made through local authorities, police,
NGO staff, or village-based volunteers linked into a broader district-wide reporting
network such as the Community-Based UXO Risk Reduction Program (CBURR).
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Figure 3 - CMAC Depiction of EOD Operations 1996-2005

This map emphasises the pattern of CMAC EOD operations since 1996 when
operations were fully recorded in the CMAC database. Essentially, these operations are
considered emergency response in nature, reacting to reports from communities and local
authorities.
Although most EOD operations have up until the last few years, been primarily
“emergency” tasked, CMAC/JMAS and MAG have begun to adopt a more methodical
approach to dealing with ERW contamination. While still maintaining an “emergency
response” capability, both operators have decided to focus resources on particular areas
for a period of time and effectively “blitz” impacted villages. Evidence of these
operations can be clearly seen from CMAC/JMAS records for EOD operations in Prey
Veng province. Figure 4 below demonstrates recent operations in Prey Veng province
targeting Kompong Leav for sustained EOD operations.
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Figure 4 - Close up of CMAC EOD Operations in Prey Veng Province 2003-2005

During 2004-2005, the two CMAC/JMAS EOD teams operating in Prey Veang
conducted a total of 245 tasks in just two districts17. Similar outputs are recorded for the
MAG EOD teams operating in the northwest of the country.
The study team visited CMAC/JMAS, MAG and HALO Trust EOD teams in
field operations. The differences between organizational technical procedures is minimal
in nature, SOP’s are similar and these teams on the whole operate relatively safely.
However, the CMAC teams operate at a disadvantage with only three (3) EOD operators
per team, which restricts their capacity to control access to demolitions when operating in
populated areas.
Overall, the operational capacities of the EOD operators can be characterized as
light responsive EOD operations capable of responding quickly to destroy or remove land
service and small air ordnance (bomblets) from airdropped ordnance.

17

JMAS Annual Report, June 2004-May 2005, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Undated
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Table 2 - Summary of EOD Operational and Technical Capacity in Cambodia
Operational & Technical Capacity
EOD Teams

CMAC
21 tms
@ 3 men ea

MAG
up to 10 tms*
@ 5 men ea

HALO
3 tms
@ 5 men ea

RCAF
0
0

EOD Training and Technical Advisory Support

3

3

3

No

Detection Capacity
Bomb Locators
Large Loop Detectors
Metal Detectors

3
3
3

3
3
3

No
3
3

3
3
3

Disposal Capacity
Electric Initiation
Neutralization & Disarming Equip
Special Charges
Bulk Demolitions capacity
Small Arms Incendiary Capacity

3
3
3
No
No

3
No
3
3**
No

3
No
3
3**
3

No
3
No
No
No

*Note - MAG supports up to 10 EOD teams dependent on funding availability.
** Note - MAG & HALO have technical advisory staff to support bulk munitions demolitions other
organizations lack training and experience in this specialty.

Nationally the maximum of 131 men are allocated to dedicated EOD teams. Each
organization has a limited amount of enhanced detection capacity in bomb locators and
large loop detectors suitable for EOD/BAC operations. Notably, is the lack of training or
equipment for neutralizing or disarming techniques. Organizations that have .50 cal dearmers do not have access to specialized ammunition to support this equipment.
CMAC, MAG and HALO Trust have trained Cambodian EOD staff to use special
charges effectively for demolition tasks. These organizations increasing rely upon these
techniques in light of a declining availability of high-grade plastic explosive. Goldenwest
explosive recovery project is a potential source of high-grade explosive and special
charges for the future. During the conduct of this report Golden West Foundation
delivered its first experimental special charges to CMAC, MAG and HALO Trust for
field trials, the results these tests are not finalised.
Bulk munitions demolitions requires specific training and careful execution of
these delicate tasks. The RCAF recently requested support through the US Embassy to
assist cleaning up some excess munitions at K86 ammunition depot in Kompong Speu
province. HALO Trust assisted RCAF destroying large amounts of bulk munitions
including anti-personnel landmines. HALO also purposely built a reinforced incinerator
to efficiently burn large amounts of small calibre ammunition.
MAG and HALO have EOD qualified technical advisory staff to support training
and other capacity building efforts. CMAC has a technical correspondence with their
former Dutch and Belgium EOD technical advisors, however the training development
link has been severed with the withdrawal of the Belgium contingent in 2004.
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Community Risk Reduction Responses
By their very nature, large-scale technical surveys, mine and battle area clearance
operations and area-wide EOD responses are logistically complex and relatively
inflexible. They offer little scope for varying deployment plans mid-stream or diverting
assets to other smaller tasks that may be identified. As such, there is an obvious need for
mine action strategies to encompass a capacity to react to contain high-level threats or
develop interim risk reduction measures until more comprehensive responses can be
implemented.
Community risk reduction can therefore comprise a suite of responses, ranging
from the deployment of small mobile mine action teams, to the development of
community-based threat assessment, mine action planning and risk education.
Community risk reduction in Cambodia has covered a similar spectrum of responses.
Broadly speaking these can be broken down into four principal categories:
a. Emergency mine action responses, comprising the deployment of small,
highly mobile mine action teams capable of undertaking limited clearance
and/or EOD tasks.
b. Rapid mine action responses, comprising the deployment of slightly larger
mine action teams capable of undertaking clearance tasks of up a hectare
in size.
c. Risk education, comprising integration of national mine/UXO risk
education programs within primary and secondary schools; use of mass
media and employment of mine/UXO risk education teams.
d. Community engagement and mobilization strategies. Typically these are
aimed at drawing affected communities into the assessment and planning
of mine action responses. MAG utilizes mine action community liaison
staff, while CMAC, as with the Cambodian Red Cross and other CNGOs
have opted to use village-based volunteers or networks of volunteers.
Another dimension of community risk reduction that needs to be developed is that
of institutional support from the national police. As recommended in the Tampering
study, this should comprise:
a. Establishing coordination mechanisms with mine action operators and
scrap dealers; the latter with a view to monitoring and reporting ordnance
in the scrap trade as well as enforce responsible purchasing practices
amongst scrap collectors.
b. Disseminating information and training key stakeholders in the legal
framework governing weapons, explosives and munitions (mine action
operators, police, local level authorities and scrap dealers).
c. Standardizing police responses to ordnance reports.
d. Formalizing the role of the police in national reporting structures.
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Emergency and Rapid Mine Action Responses
The ability to deploy small, highly mobile mine action teams capable of
responding to contained high level threats is an essential component of community risk
reduction. Various modalities have been used in Cambodia over the past five to ten years,
ranging from CMAC’s five member Community Mine Marking Teams, capable of
conducting small scale mine/UXO clearance, survey, long term marking, EOD and
mine/UXO awareness education, to MAG’s eight member Rapid Response Teams
providing a similar range of mine action responses.
The success of these teams’ lies in their ability to be deployed far more flexibly
than larger demining platoons - this enables them to respond to a greater number of high
impact tasks in a much timelier manner. Additionally, as the majority of these emergency
tasks involve securing safe access to water points, farming lands and neighbouring
communities, their impact goes well beyond immediate risk reduction and begins to
address some of the major restrictions on daily livelihood activities posed by ERW
contamination.
Combined multi-skilled teams with advanced EOD/BAC capacity is the way
forward for dealing with the longer-term ERW challenges.

Mine/UXO Risk Education
Although the impact of mine/UXO risk education (MRE) on casualty reduction is
often minimized among certain sectors of the mine action community, its importance in
community risk reduction cannot be understated. Numerous KAP surveys and other
qualitative research have clearly shown that MRE has contributed to improved awareness
and adoption of safer practices among many populations, and as such should be treated as
a valued adjunct to mine clearance and/or EOD activities.
Perhaps the greatest weakness in traditional MRE however is in the realm of
affecting change in intentional behaviour, such as people who knowingly enter mined
areas or consciously handle ERW. Most MRE in this respect is poorly lacking in
understanding of behaviour change dynamics, and as such unable to develop effective
alternative interventions outside of “abstention” messages (to draw a parallel with some
of the more simplistic approaches to HIV/AIDS prevention education promoted by
USAID among others).
Modifying intentional behaviour requires a markedly different approach to
awareness raising and generic risk education. Reducing casualties resulting from
intentional handling of UXO, particularly among children and adolescents, will require
significantly more intensive and complex MRE interventions than are currently
employed. As such, there is a palpable need to develop an appropriate knowledge base
and practice of behaviour change theories and approaches among national MRE
practitioners. Without this, most MRE in Cambodia will remain predominantly limited to
various takes on information dissemination.
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Another key issue in relation to MRE is the extent to which external agencies
should be held responsible for conditioning behaviour within mine/UXO affected
communities. As Moyes contends, “…Given the duration over which ordnance
contamination is going to persist in Cambodia it is of fundamental importance to
establish that the responsibility for transferring knowledge regarding dangerous items and
for policing dangerous behaviours lies with affected communities themselves.”
Moyes sees the role of external organizations as one of facilitating local
discussion of risks and risk practices with a view to agreeing on “…a framework of what
is and what is not considered acceptable and responsible behaviour.” Behaviours that
contravene this framework should be subject to social sanction. In this respect,
“…communities need to be able to draw upon an effective and supportive response from
the police in order to address problematic behaviour.”
Community engagement and mobilization
All of the components so far mentioned are ultimately dependent on the effective
engagement and mobilization of affected communities. Without this, vital local
information will remain untapped, village resources under-utilized and community
commitment essentially lacking. Various approaches have been explored, ranging from
the use of mine action community liaison staff to village-based volunteers or networks of
volunteers.
The most recent attempt to establish a system-wide approach to community
engagement has been CMAC’s Community-Based Mine Risk Reduction and UXO Risk
Reduction Programs (CBMRR and CBURR). Established in late 2001, the CBMRR
program comprises a network of 13 District Focal Points (DFPs)18 operating in 13 of the
30 most mine affected districts of Cambodia. In all, the program covers four provinces19
and a total of 99 villages, with two volunteers from each village forming a local
mine/UXO committee. Similar committees have also been established at commune and
district levels. Together, all three committees form the mine risk reduction network. The
DFPs are managed by Provincial Coordinators and supported by two Training and
Monitoring Officers; all operating out of their respective Demining Units. Overall
management is through a Program Manager and Project Officer based at CMAC
Headquarters in Phnom Penh.
Working in tandem, the CBMRR District Focal Points and Mine/UXO
Committees (MUCs) facilitate participatory mine/UXO assessments at village level. This
involves both spatial mapping of suspected areas as well as qualitative assessment of how
this impacts the community. Information gathered not only serves to better inform a
range of mine action interventions, from technical surveys and clearance tasks to risk

18

Many of these Focal Points have been recruited from Bureaus within the District Government, or from
Provincial Departmental Offices. This is also the case with the CBURR program.

19

The program operates in Battambang, Banteay Meanchey, Krong Pailin and Pursat provinces.
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education and victim assistance, but also assists communities in identifying and
determining broader development needs and priorities.
One of the key products to come out of these assessments is a detailed map of the
village and its surrounds. In addition to recording and locating village infrastructure,
these maps also identify known and suspected contaminated areas and if possible,
location of incidents and casualties. Together with the results of other Poverty Reduction
Assessment (PRA) exercises, such as wealth ranking, population mobility mapping and
village seasonal calendars, these maps offer a comprehensive assessment of mine/UXO
vulnerability and have proved an invaluable resource to technical survey, clearance and
EOD operations20.
Given the success of the CBMRR program, CMAC agreed to auspice a local
NGO, Kampuchea Mine Action Service (KMAS) to trial a similar approach in Angsnoul
district in Kandal province, and Chba Mon district in Kompong Speu. The significant
difference being that the new project would respond to UXO contamination. In July
2005, the project was expanded to a further 10 districts, including four in Svay Rieng and
four in Prey Veng provinces. Funding for the project, now known as CBURR, has been
secured through the Japan Mine Action Service (JMAS).
CBURR is similarly structured to the CBMRR program, utilizing a network of
District Focal Points supported by commune and village based UXO volunteers. Unlike
CBMRR however, the CBURR program is managed out of the CMAC EOD section and
does not have specifically dedicated coordinators at provincial level, nor Training and
Monitoring Officers. Another major difference between the two programs relates to their
operational conceptualization and implementation.
While both programs share similar objectives, there is a marked difference in the
nature and comprehensiveness of the responses. In essence, the CBMRR program
engages community members in assessment and discussion of the problem, so as to better
inform mine action interventions. On the other hand, Community engagement under
CBURR is at this point primarily limited to villagers reporting the presence of UXO and
fielding requests for EOD.
Although the program contemplates the development of risk education
interventions and support to access victim assistance services, neither of these areas are
particularly well-developed. Equally, there is little activity in terms of community
assessment of problems arising from UXO contamination (there is no village mapping for
example) and, as reported in a recent internal evaluation of the program21; the DFPs have
tended to work in isolation of other potential reporting networks such as the national
police. Many of these shortcomings may result from the relatively short training provided
to CBURR focal points and that staff and volunteers have not been able to benefit from
on-going formation and monitoring that their CBMRR counterparts have enjoyed.

20

It should be mentioned that the MAG Community Liaison program uses similar methodology, as does
World Vision Cambodia.
21
“Evaluation Report: Efficiency Task for 3 Months, July-September 2005. CBURR”. CMAC, Phnom
Penh, Cambodia. September, 2005.
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As the recent CBURR evaluation demonstrates, CMAC are aware of some of the
changes required and are working toward implementing these. What is unclear is whether
CMAC recognizes the fundamental difference in the conceptualization of each program,
and if so, what action is proposed to bring CBURR closer into line with its counterpart.
What needs to be remembered is that the real strength of both programs lies in their
ability to engage communities in responding to the comprehensive problems of mine and
UXO contamination. The creation of district-wide UXO reporting systems is something
that could, and ultimately should be developed through the National Police, with CMAC.

Training Capacity
Training capacity in Cambodia has been part of the mine action landscape since
the UN intervention in 1992. Initially, the training centered on MCTU activities preparing
demining units to support the elections. Later, the first CMAC Training Center (TC) was
established in Battambang. This center was destroyed in the fighting during the Khmer
Rouge assault along National Route #10 in 1994. The CMAC TC was re-located north of
Phnom Penh at the former UNHCR Returnee Reception Center, finally, the present
CMAC TC is located in Kompong Chnang.
The CMAC TC has a history of training all manner of mine action courses,
however this study only focused on EOD training. As depicted in Table 3, the majority of
training has been conducted by Dutch & Belgium EOD Technical Advisors assisted by
Cambodian EOD operators and managers. The development of a dedicated EOD Training
School was funded by the German Government and initiated in 2000, however this effort
has not received funding to sustain its development. Under a series of funding
restrictions, CMAC has not been able to support a dedicated EOD School.
Table 3- Dutch & Belgian Supported EOD Training for CMAC 1993-2000
Type of Training
First Basic EOD course
(4 wks)
Second Basic EOD course
(6 wks)
Third Basic EOD course
(6 wks)
Fourth Basic EOD course
(6 wks)
Fifth Basic EOD course
(6 wks)
First Advanced EOD
course (3 wks)

Training Center
(TC)
TC Battambang

Instructors Netherland (NL
and Belgium (BE)
NL Air Force EOD

No of
Students
±6

Date

TC Phnom Penh

NL Army EOD

± 12

May 1994

TC Phnom Penh

NL Army EOD

± 12

Dec. 1995

TC Kampong
Chnang
TC Kampong
Chnang
TC Kampong
Chnang

NL Army EOD

± 12

Feb. 1998

NL Army EOD and
BE Army EOD
NL Army EOD and BE
Army EOD

± 12

Nov. 1998

± 12

1999

Early 1993

66*
* Note - Five basic courses and one advanced course totalling (66) trained Cambodians (Fiers, 2006).

The only Cambodian institutional EOD training capacity in resides within CMAC
EOD management and operational teams. This limited pool of trained personnel is fully
engaged in operations and does not maintain a training capacity. Training aids,
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instructional tools, lesson plans and curriculum have been fully developed during CMAC
EOD experience over a decade. However, these assets are degrading owing to the ad hoc
nature of sustaining EOD training expertise.
A recent basic EOD course was put together to cross-train CMAC MRE teams
into multi-skilled EOD Response teams. The instructional cadre were brought from
CMAC HQ and field units to develop the course and provide training.
Unfortunately, these makeshift arrangements do not encourage the best practices
of professional level training for the sector. Overall, the training capacity in Cambodia is
deteriorating due to the lack of investment in training facilities and “train the trainer”
programs.
Donor Interventions & Funding Environment
Owing to the high cost of mine clearance and the fact that such operations have
been funded for over a decade in Cambodia, many observers believe that there is an
element of “donor fatigue” emerging and that levels of funding will certainly begin to
wane. Adding to this likely decline, is the realization that with better surveying and
improved clearance methodology, most of the remaining high impact tasks, particularly
those located in the K5 area, could feasibly be completed in five to ten years.
If there are sufficient indications over the next few years that this projection is
realistic, then it is highly probable that mine action funding will begin to significantly
scale down. It appears that the RG holds a similar view and is preparing to assume
responsibility for mine action from 2015 onward.
There is a very real risk that as the number of high impact tasks decreases, along
with an attendant drop in national mine casualties that donors may declare, “mission
accomplished” and begin to redirect funding elsewhere. It is imperative therefore that the
mine action sector in Cambodia be able to effectively scope a well-informed and cost
effective national strategy for addressing remaining ERW contamination.
Despite these projections however, CMAC, MAG and HALO Trust have all been
able to significantly expand their operations over the past four to five years. This would
appear to confirm their ability to capture mine action funds within a relatively
competitive world market. It may also suggest that donors are becoming more cognizant
of the need to capitalize on past investments. Whichever the case, the recent $16 million
USD equipment grant awarded to CMAC by the Japanese, and a smaller, but similar
grant provided to MAG, may in fact represent the last of the major funding for capital
expansion in Cambodia.
Of all operators, CMAC has been the most successful in transforming its primary
funding base, shifting from reliance on the UNDP Mine Action Trust Fund for the
majority of its funding in 2001, to drawing most of its funding from bilateral sources in
2004. At the time of writing, 18.6 million USD had been committed to fund mine action
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operations22 during 2005-2006 fiscal year. This is somewhat down on 2004-2005 funding
which amounted to just over 36 million USD, though 16 million USD of this consisted of
a one off grant to CMAC for expansion of capital equipment23.
Historically, funding for mine action in Cambodia has typically included support
for:
a. Mine clearance, survey, MRE and EOD operations,
b. Institutional support for the national regulatory authority, CMAA; and
provincial mine action planning units, MAPUs,
c. Operational support for socio-economic planning and management of
cleared lands,
d. Maintenance of the Cambodian Red Cross Cambodian Mine Victim
Information Service (CMVIS), and
e. Provision of victim assistance services and sectoral research.
Direct funding assistance is commonly augmented by in-kind technical support to
CMAC provided from Belgium, Japan, New Zealand and US and on-going institutional
support to RCAF, CMAA and CMAC from the Royal Government of Cambodia.
Funding has been provided in two ways: direct grants to national and international mine
action agencies and development organizations, and through the UNDP Mine Action
Trust Fund. Contributions to the Trust Fund have been used to fund mine action
operations as well as generalized institutional support, as in the cases of CMAC and
CMAA.
CMAC, the Halo Trust and MAG have been the main recipients of mine action
funding, with CMAC receiving close to USD 10 million per year in overseas
development assistance since 2002. Government funds or proceeds from World Bank and
ADB development loans have been utilized to fund clearance for road construction and
other rural infrastructure development conducted by the RCAF.
CMAC
In addition to the cash contributions described above, CMAC’s resources are
augmented by in-kind contributions from several donors. In 2004-2005, for example, the
Japanese Government provided brush cutting, transport and protective equipment worth
$16.0 million. Belgium, Japan, New Zealand and US have been providing technical
advisors in such specialties as disposal of explosive ordnance, training, logistics and
information technology.
22

This amount was derived from figures provided by operators and UNDP. It is not indicative of total mine
action funding, which would include resourcing of the CMAA, PMACs, MAPUs as well as other mine
action related entities such as CMVIS, etc.

23

Source: “Joint Evaluation of Mine Action in Cambodia for the Donor Working Group on Mine Action”,
R. Griffin & R. Keeley, 2004 (this figure includes 16M USD grant from Japan to CMAC for the purchase
of capital equipment).
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The HALO Trust
For the current year, the Halo Trust is receiving grants for mine action from six
bi-lateral donors and five international NGOs. The Trust’s budget for 2006, which cannot
be precisely calculated as some project budgets are not on a calendar year basis, is
estimated at around $4.13 million USD.
MAG
MAG also has diverse funding base, receiving grants from six bi-lateral and
multi-lateral donors and four international NGOs. MAG’s 2005-2006 budget, which like
Halo’s is difficult to calculate for the calendar year, is in the vicinity of $2.46 million. In
the case of MAG’s NGO donors, funding is provided as a fee for services. The NGOs
hire MAG to clear mines in designated areas where they are implementing development
projects. These arrangements are established as partnerships based on memoranda of
understanding rather than as commercial transactions.
RCAF
World Bank and Asian Development Bank reported that their rural road
rehabilitation loans require the Government to undertake mine clearance for road rightof-way. Thus, it appears that RCAF is funded directly by the Government from loan
proceeds or counterpart funds. The mechanism by which the Government provides funds
to RCAF to undertake mine clearance is unclear.
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PART II: ERW ANALYSIS & NEEDS ASSESSMENT
Potential surface area affected by ERW contamination
With the exception of CMVIS data all surveys in Cambodia are criticized for
accuracy depicting ERW contamination in terms of density, size and location of areas.
Inherent with unprocessed data are problems of accuracy and reliability to develop
strategic projections or detailed operational planning. Regardless of accuracy or
reliability, the compilation of available information affects all planning, budgeting and
operations. Although these factors do not cripple the value of the data, as strategic
planning tools it is necessary to consider the accuracy of current national strategic
projections and planning using data without full analyses.
This study found that throughout all the surveys, with exception of the original
UNTAC Mine Liaison survey, at no time were the former armed factions seriously
involved in the survey data collection processes. RCAF military officers demonstrate
clear knowledge of the mine laying plans and operations during the war period24.
Delivering, emplacing and managing the huge K5 mine barrier on the Thai-Cambodian
border required military administration, logistics and record keeping. The RCAF is an
information source not fully exploited, which could have potential cost saving benefits
relieving unnecessary technical survey and mine clearance operations.
In 2000, Geospatial International began a nation wide survey tasked with assessing
the scope and impact of ERW contamination in Cambodia. As with other National Level
One Surveys (L1S), the Cambodian exercise attempted to cover the entire breadth of the
country, visiting every registered population centre. In all, the survey teams visited
13,908 villages located across Cambodia’s 24 provinces (Geospatial, 2002). The results
of the Geospatial survey are widely criticized for its social-economic impact
incompleteness, limited mine action community involvement and poor distribution (EC,
2003). Some members of the mine action community question the currency and utility of
this information.
The Landmine Monitor records mine action data since 1992, and describes the
contamination in Cambodia prior to the L1S;
“In 1998, 1,249 known new casualties occurred. More than 644 square
kilometers of land is known to be mined, and another 1,400 square
kilometers is suspected to be mined. In a country where 85 percent of the
population is dependent upon agriculture or related activities, such a
contamination represents a massive restriction of Cambodia’s economic
base.” (ICBL, 1999)
Differences between the 1998 data and the L1S completed in 2002 are dramatic.
The 2002 survey shows 3,037 suspect mine/uxo areas throughout Cambodia a 100%
increase from the 1998 figures. The surface area recorded equals 4,466 km² twice the
original 1999 estimate. Its entirely possible that mine contamination information
24

RCAF staff claim records exist in Cambodia and Vietnam for logistics and mine laying operations in the
K5 border areas.
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available prior to the L1S is a not collated and analysed with the UNTAC Mine Liaison
Team and HALO Trust surveys.
This study observed that both the CMAC database and L1S data are used
simultaneously, to develop information or record data. This two very different data sets
with entirely diverse levels of accuracy are not compatible for strategic or operational
planning. Adding to the potpourri of data sources and usage, CMAC conducted some
limited impact survey of its own in 2002, this exercise was primarily restricted to
gathering further information on selected areas. It appears that CMAC uses both data sets
in tandem. Information management across the mine action sector in Cambodia is poor.
Despite contentions about the accuracy and utility of estimates reached by the
Cambodia L1S, it nonetheless represents the only nation-wide appraisal of ERW
contamination in the country, and as such, the only comprehensive baseline of its sort.
At the conclusion of the survey in 2002, the L1S had identified 3,037 ERW affected
areas, covering some 4,544 kms2 or approximately 2.5 percent of Cambodia’s total land
surface. The authors of the L1S admit that the survey “…questionnaire is not well
designed with respect to contamination and its quantification”. The database query
application will sort and aggregate numbers of affected areas, but not the spatial estimates
of contamination (GIS area). This is only possible through directly querying individual
village records within the database files, in many cases field by field. Doing this however
allows the total estimated affected area to be separated into three main categories:
a. Suspected mine contaminated land (3,214 kms2 or 71 percent of total L1S
suspect area),
b. Land suspected to be contaminated by air service cluster munitions25
resulting in socio-economic impact26 and/or spot UXO (270 kms2 or 6
percent of total L1S suspect area), and
c. Land suspected to be contaminated by a mix of mines and various types of
land and air service battle debris (1,060 kms2 or 23 percent of total L1S
suspect area). This last area can be broken down into three further subcategories:

25
26

•

Land affected by mines and battle debris, predominantly spot
distributed land service munitions (697 kms2 or 15 percent of total
L1S suspect area),

•

Land affected exclusively by land service munitions (13 kms2 or
0.3 percent total L1S suspect area), and

•

Land affected by mines and non-impact cluster munitions (350
kms2 or 8 percent of total L1S suspect area).

The L1S did not query respondents about other types of air ordnance contamination.
The L1S uses socio-economic indicators to define impact from cluster munitions. These include
restricted access to agricultural land; pasture land; water sources; forest (gathering activities); existing
homes; potential housing land; health centers; markets; pagodas; canals and other irrigation
infrastructure; bridges; business activities; neighbouring villages; school and other.
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Over half of the area under the first and second sub-categories (i.e land affected by
mines and battle debris or solely by land service UXO), is located in the northwestern
provinces of Battambang, Otdar Meanchey, Banteay Meanchey, Pailin and Pursat. Other
impacted provinces include Kampong Cham, Kompong Thom, Kampot and Kompong
Speu (accounting for 21 percent). Only 11 percent of land area under this sub-category
falls in the northeast of the country.
Almost 40 percent of land under the third sub-category (i.e. affected by mines and
non-impact cluster munitions) lies in Koh Kong, suggesting that the border province may
have been used as a drop zone for returning US and Thai aircraft that failed to reach their
targets inside Cambodia or Laos. The remaining area in this category, totalling some 215
kms2 is largely spread across Kompong Cham, Kompong Thom, Kompong Speu and
Kratie provinces. Close to 90 percent (238 kms2) of L1S areas affected by cluster
munitions resulting in socio-economic impact are located in the central and northeastern
provinces of Steung Treng, Ratanak Kiri, Kompong Cham, Kompong Thom and Kratie.
Table 4 - Breakdown of L1S mixed contamination areas by type of ordnance (Land vs
Air)
L1S areas estimated to be affected by mixed mine
and land service AXO & UXO contamination
(excluding impact air service cluster munitions)
No areas

Province

L1S areas estimated to be affected exclusively by
impact air service cluster munitions & spot UXO

Area km2

No areas

Province

Area
km2

Battambang

307

314

Stueng Treng

26

106

Otdar Meanchey

119

84

Ratanak Kiri

20

44

Banteay Meanchey

94

82

Kompong Cham

78

34

Pursat

75

60

Kompong Thom

70

32

Pailin

62

37

Kratie

16

22

Other areas of significant contamination

Other areas of significant contamination

Kompong Cham

136

71

Kandal

76

7.5

Kampong Thom

111

67

Kompong Speu

44

7.5

Kampot

103

40

Preah Vihear

22

7

175
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Svay Rieng

4

4

396

270

Kompong Speu
o

2

Total n areas/km

1531

1060

o

2

Total n areas/km

Likely Surface Area Affected by ERW Contamination
CMAC, Halo Trust and MAG have all initiated technical surveys (TS) of their
own as a means of providing more detailed and robust planning information. These
technical surveys are a result of the rapid reclamation of land by local people in
previously suspected mined areas. CMAC has the largest dedicated technical survey
capacity of all operators. During 2005, it conducted 13 technical surveys of high casualty
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villages located in nine provinces. These surveys comprise area verification,
quantification and designation exercises.
The first step involves reviewing L1S and CMAC’s own Impact Survey data for a
particular area; drawing in additional information derived from CBMRR village mapping
and PRA impact assessments, CMVIS casualty data, and primary information from key
village informants. This exercise is conducted in-situ. On the basis of this review, areas
designated by the L1S or CMAC’s own Impact Survey as “suspect”, are either validated
or removed from the list. CMAC refers to this as their ‘First Technical Survey’. Most of
the area removed during this process of information reduction comprises land that has
been used without incident for several years and is considered by the local population as
posing negligible risk.
During this process concerns rise about spatial and geographic accuracy of L1S
data with a growing ratio of clearance operations that are falling outside L1S survey areas
(currently estimated to be anywhere from 30 percent to almost 60 percent27). Although
not fully investigated during this study these additional suspected areas are most likely a
product of operators not having access to uniform set of collated data and an expected
limited accuracy of the L1S28.
The next stage of the technical survey involves physical verification of the
remaining suspect areas through the use of breaching lanes. Mechanical assets and mine
detection dogs (MDD) are available but not widely deployed in support of TS. During
this phase, areas are classified into three categories:
a. Confirmed contaminated by mines,
b. Suspected mined, and
c. Residual mined (i.e. land presently used for housing, cultivation or other
uses, where there has been historical or physical evidence of mines, but no
subsequent incidents or items found within the past two years).
It should be noted here that these technical surveys are primarily focused on
identifying and delineating high threat areas primarily contaminated by mines, not
necessarily ERW, which are generally treated as lower risk.

Technical Survey & Area Reduction Analysis
Illustrating the need for area reduction and enhanced technical survey of mined
areas is an analysis of a series of CMAC technical surveys conducted in 2005.

27

Estimates derived from CMAA and the report, “Joint Evaluation of Mine Action in Cambodia for the
Donor Working Group on Mine Action”: Robert Griffin. R, Keeley. R, December, 2004. Phnom Penh,
Cambodia
28
L1S survey teams spent little more than a few hours per village to complete a national survey of +3000
villages. Accuracy of information is expected to be ±70%, reasonable for strategic planning and limited
operational deployment planning.
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Nine of these 13 technical surveys were conducted in villages surveyed by L1S;
the other five were presumably conducted in areas covered by CMAC’s own Impact
Survey. Within these nine “L1S” areas, CMAC reports to have reduced the original
suspected surface area by 35.2 kms2, from original targeted 66 kms2 designated for area
reduction through technical survey. Within this 35km2 area, the technical survey teams
identified 228 individual suspected mined areas.
These outcomes would appear to substantiate claims that L1S spatial estimates are
overly inflated, in this case, by more than 100 percent. The L1S however only covers
seven of those nine villages, comprising a total suspect area of 41kms2, not the 66 kms2
the TS attributed to the Level One. It can only be assumed that the remaining 25 kms2 has
been derived from CMAC’s own local Impact Survey and added to the L1S estimate29.
The two sites, where this appears to be the case are O’ Ta Mou and Ta Ey villages
in Svay Teab district, Svay Rieng province, and Thmal Keng village in Sala Krau district,
Pailin (Ta Ey village doesn’t appear in the L1S, so it is assumed that it adjoins O’ Ta
Mou and has been settled since the L1S was completed). The L1S estimate for these sites
is 16 kms2; the CMAC L1S attributed estimate is 43 kms2. The remaining 7 km2
differential is from the two other sites surveyed, Phum Ou and Phnom Touch villages in
Kamreang district, Battambang province, which although attributed to the L1S, do not
appear in the December 2002 version of the database. Excluding these and other similar
anomalies evident in the 2004 report, it is still useful to look what the CMAC Technical
Survey Teams were able to achieve with respect to reducing actual L1S estimated areas.
Through both technical survey exercises (information reduction and physical area
reduction), the teams reduced the seven L1S areas from the original estimate of 41 kms2
to 30 kms2. A further reduction is possible by excluding areas classified as residual,
bringing the total area reduced to 31 kms2. This represents a 29 percent reduction of the
overall original area. In addition, the teams were able to categorize areas far more
definitively than the generic ‘suspect’ classification provided by the L1S, in all
delineating 120 confirmed mined areas, 175 suspect areas and 62 residual areas.
While it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions about the scope of potential
overall area reduction, TS outcomes to date do suggest that the L1S spatial estimates may
be inflated by up to 30 percent in some cases. An interesting correlation that may support
this hypothesis is the degree of difference between L1S area estimates of impact cluster
munitions and those derived from SEADAB bombing records. Table 5 represents an
estimate of area affected by multiple cluster munitions strikes within 500 metres of a
national and/or rural road (proximity to national and rural roads being the closest possible
measure of impact accordant to L1S criteria).

29

Use of multiple data sets, not been codified into a common register of suspected contaminated area
complicates analytical comparisons.
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Table 5 - Comparison of SEADAB records vs L1S estimated surface area affected by
single and multiple cluster munitions strikes.
Affected Areas & Population

Hectares

Total L1S estimated area reporting cluster bomb impact

27,000

Square
Kilometres
270

Total L1S estimated area reduced by 30%

19,000

190

Total area affected by more than two cluster munitions strikes30

48,370

483.7

Total area affected by more than two recorded cluster munitions strikes &
located within 500m of a national rte or rural road31

19,357

193.5

# of
People

L1S affected population

141,847

Estimated affected population from “Landscan” imaging

106,507

* Excludes cluster munitions types: BLU27 & 32b Firebombs, CBU222 INC Smoke and anti-riot. Source:
USAF Bombing Missions 1970-1975, SEADAB

As can be seen in the table, reducing the L1S estimate by 30 percent brings it
almost exactly into line with alternative estimates derived from the SEADAB. While
there is a 50 percent probability that this correlation purely coincidental, there is an equal
probability that it is not. For this reason, there is a strong argument for further
triangulation of available data to provide informed estimates of area affected and better
quantification analysis of the L1S overall. Similar estimations of area contaminated by
battle debris (such as those affected “spot” and “field” contamination) may be possible
through analysis of several other data sets held by the US National Archives (NARA)32
and unreleased military records of the Vietnamese and Cambodian governments.
Taking this alternative cluster munitions estimate into account and applying a
potential area reduction of up to 30 percent, the total L1S area can be reduced to just over
3200 kms2 (a reduction of 1,340 kms2). Given current mine action priorities, it is likely
that most of this reduction will be achieved primarily in mine suspected areas. The
remaining areas represent Battle Area Clearance (BAC) tasks; the potential scope of
which is discussed below.
Possible scope of Battle Area Clearance and EOD
Using the L1S and SEADAB, it is possible to draw some estimate of the total area
possibly affected by mixed contamination. As already mentioned, the L1S estimate of
area affected by impact cluster munitions and spot UXO lies somewhere between 190
km2 (assuming a 30% area reduction) and 270 km2. Estimates derived from the SEADAB
30

Includes secondary and tertiary rural roads and cart tracks.
Ibid.
32
These include Cambodian Friendly Units Files (FANK), Cambodian Incidents File (KHMER), Enemy
Base Area File (BASFA) July 1966-June 1971, Situation Report Army Files, 7/31/1966-3/12/1973.
31
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are around the 190 km2 mark as well. The L1S estimate of area affected by mines and
battle debris, predominantly spot distributed land service munitions, ranges from 488 km2
(assuming a 30% area reduction) to 697 km2. A further 245 km2 (assuming a 30% area
reduction) to 350 km2 can be added to this for land affected by mines and non-impact
cluster munitions. The remaining area comprises 9 km2 to 13 km2 of land affected solely
by land service UXO.
The following table details the possible scope of technical survey; Battle Area
Clearance and/or EOD tasks based on L1S estimates.
Table 6 - Possible Scope of BAC & EOD Tasks
L1S Area (km2)
270

After 30% Reduction (km2)
190

Area affected by mines & spot UXO

697

488

Area affected by mines & non-impact cluster munitions

350

245

Area affected by land service munitions

13

9

1330

931

Types of Contaminated Area (L1S & SEADAB)
Area affected by cluster munitions & spot UXO

Total

Of the above, the only areas that could be approached exclusively as Battle Area
Clearance tasks are those estimated to be free of mines (i.e. some 199 kms2 -283 kms2).
The remaining areas would need extensive technical survey in order to locate suspected
minefields, and then area reduced utilizing a combination of Battle Area Clearance and
standard demining procedures.
Assuming all of these areas can be reduced by up to 30 percent through technical
survey and area reduction, the potential area requiring exclusive BAC may be as little as
200 kms2, and the area requiring combined BAC and mine clearance, 733 kms2.
As very little large scale Battle Area Clearance has been conducted in Cambodia,
it is difficult to estimate how long it would take to clear this total area. The experience of
demining teams who have undertaken area verification tasks, ostensibly deep searches of
areas for high-metal content ordnance (i.e. sub-surface anti-tank mines, UXO or air
service munitions), may provide some indication of the expected pace of BAC. Other
experiences such as UXO Laos can be used for initial estimates.
Recent field trials in Laos indicate that a four man teams using hand held brush
cutters, wide area deep search detectors with analytical software, and large-loop detectors
are able to clear one hectare (10,000m2) of cluster munitions contaminated ground in 3
days (Kaminski, 2006). This systemized approach to BAC operations has increased
productively by a factor of 600% over traditional mine clearance techniques used in Laos
and Cambodia. The high productivity of small BAC teams promises cost efficient
operations for proactive ERW operations in the future.
CMAC mine clearance operations in the northwest, north and east of the country
have found averages of 7-9 UXO per hectare (numbers exclude caches). The average
number of AXO/UXO found during all CMAC clearance operations is just over 18 items
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per hectare33. These are not high numbers by any means. Another point worth
considering is that despite the size of area contaminated by air service cluster munitions,
CMAC EOD operations in known strike areas have not found extensive numbers of air
service munitions (generally less that 20 percent of all items destroyed) 34.
This would suggest that a majority of surface items have either already been
removed or deteriorated to such an extent that they no longer pose a threat. This raises the
question of responding to sub-surface cluster munitions and other ERW.
EOD/BAC Operational Analysis
While EOD/BAC planning generally demonstrates some use and analysis of
secondary data sources such as CMVIS, L1S and USAF bombing records, it is generally
fairly light in the capture and use of primary information derived from affected
communities themselves. Although most EOD teams generally conduct some
reconnaissance of their own, this does not normally extend to village mapping of ERW
contamination. Both MAG, through its Community Liaison Teams and CMAC, with its
CBURR network has the capability to do this, but such efforts are generally contained to
mapping mine contamination.
Although defining the spatial dispersion of ERW is likely to be more difficult
compared to that of mines, simply because of the size of area affected, the use of village
mapping to scope ERW contamination at least needs to be trialed to see what benefit, if
any it may have in respect to EOD/BAC deployment. CMAC is probably in the best
position to do this; given its CBURR program and recent integration of MRE and EOD
staff into new five-person multi-skilled teams. While such mapping may ultimately prove
to be of limited value to “emergency” EOD tasking, it would certainly assist in
identifying and scoping Battle Area Clearance tasks.
It is important to note that outside of the L1S, there have been no other attempts
to systematically survey the extent of uxo, cluster munitions and other battle debris
contamination in the country. While it is not surprising that priority has been given to
scoping national mine contamination, if the CMAA and operators are serious about
dealing with the remaining ERW threat, then such surveying needs to be developed at he
earliest possible time. Relying on random reports of ERW is no substitute for conducting
a methodical appraisal of contamination levels, and from this deciding where and what
resources should be deployed.
Assessment of the ERW situation could be approached in a manner similar to that
currently employed by CMAC’s Technical Survey Teams (information reduction
followed by physical reduction) In fact, there are more data sources available in respect
to potential ERW contamination than there are for mined areas. Among these are the
33

Since 1993, CMAC has destroyed more than 850,000 items of ordnance; 630,378 by EOD teams and
223,077 during clearance operations.

34

It is worthwhile remembering however that the Cambodia National Level One Survey (L1S) records
more than 2,000 villages reporting problems associated with cluster munitions contamination.
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SEADAB bombing records and FANK and Khmer combat incident reports. Added to
these is information derived from operators’ own population surveying as well as
clearance and EOD/BAC Tasking reports. Although many of these records need to be
further analyzed, and in the case of the combat incident data geographically located.
There is probably sufficient material available already to complete at least a first level
information reduction for much of the country.
Known Impacts of ERW contamination in Cambodia
Estimated affected population
According to the L1S, some 6,422 or 46 percent of all Cambodian villages are
contaminated by ERW. Based on suspected surface area, this represents an affected
population of some 880,000 people35. Using the three main categories of contamination
derived from L1S fields, it can be estimated that 422,000 people are affected by
suspected mine contamination, 130,000 by air service cluster munitions resulting in
socio-economic impact, and 328,000 by a mix of mines and various types of land and air
service battle debris.
Almost 40 percent of mine-affected populations are located in the northwest, 30
percent in the central provinces of Kandal, Kompong Speu and Kompong Thom and 12
percent in the north/north east. This pattern is practically inverted with respect to cluster
munitions; with 42 percent of affected populations located in the north/north-east and 30
percent in the same central provinces of Kandal, Kompong Speu and Kompong Thom.
Impact on rural livelihoods
The L1S attempts to define the dimensions of ERW contamination and its impact
on affected populations through the use of self-assessed ratings in six principal domains.
These include high numbers of casualties (reported by 78 percent of all L1S villages),
impeded gathering activities (73 percent), restricted access to housing and farming land
(61 percent and 66 percent respectively), loss of livestock (57 percent), and difficult
access to water resources (48 percent). Other indicators that emerged during the course of
the survey included restricted access to neighbouring villages and public facilities
(schools and health clinics); impediments to infrastructure development (roads, schools,
hospitals), and restriction of livelihood activities (utilization of forest resources, access to
markets, pasture lands, etc).

35

The L1S estimates some 5,187,000 people or 45 percent of the country’s population to be “at risk”,
although what this term refers to or how the figure was reached is unclear. The L1S puts the number of
people in areas reporting no contamination at 10,139,095. This figure represents 88 percent of the
country’s total population. Other calculations also call the population at risk figure into question (e.g.
1,640 villages with L1S areas divided by Population at Risk returns an average village size of 3,162
inhabitants. The average village population derived from L1S recorded data however is 803)

51

Across all six principal domains, 53 percent of contaminated villages reported
severe to very severe impact, with access to farming land being the most heavily
impacted. Other severely impacted domains include access to housing land, high numbers
of casualties and impeded gathering activities. Various studies have also highlighted the
referred costs from impeded development, citing indicators such as reduced numbers of
crops and lower yields due to inadequate irrigation or meagre returns on produce due to
high transport costs and restricted access to markets.
The national strategy does not define impact or the priority of effort that should be
allocated to various explosive hazards. In light of a diminishing landmine contamination
problem the impact of other ERW hazards is crucial for national strategic planning. These
definitions of impact are fundamental to the future planning, allocation and prioritisation
of ERW response resources.
ERW Casualties
While casualty rates have dropped significantly from the levels of the early
1990’s, they now appear to have plateaued at around 800 per annum36. The most
discernible trend within current casualty rates is the proportional shift between mine and
UXO accidents. While there has been a sustained reduction in mine casualties since 1998,
incidents involving UXO have actually increased by 13 percent. In fact, nationally, uxo
are now responsible for more than half of all ERW deaths and injuries in Cambodia (485
of 825 during 2005). This trend is consistent across most of the country with the
exception of the K5 affected provinces of Banteay Meanchey, Battambang and Pailin. In
these areas, between 2001-2005, almost two of every three casualties resulted from
mines, see Figure 5 below.
Excluding these casualties from the national figures however provides a valuable
insight into the extent of the UXO problem. Outside of mine casualties in Banteay
Meanchey, Battambang and Pailin provinces, 83 percent of all other recorded deaths and
injuries since 2001 have been caused by uxo.
These casualties are predominantly distributed across six provinces and account
for two thirds of all uxo casualties nationally37. The ratio of UXO casualties per head of
rural population in the north & northeast is approximately half the rate reported in the
northwest.

36

Unless otherwise stated, all casualty statistics have been drawn from Cambodian Red Cross Cambodian
Mine Victim Information Service (CMVIS) datasets (January 2001- November 2005)
37
Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, Krong Pailin, Otdar Meanchey, Preah Vihear and Siem Reap

52

Figure 5- Mine & UXO Casualties by Province.
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Unlike mine accidents that generally occur as a result of daily livelihood
activities38, 60 percent of uxo incidents arise from intentional interaction with the device
(or standing by as someone else handles it). As Moyes identified in ‘Tampering:
Deliberate Handling and Use of Live Ordnance in Cambodia’, “to play with” is the
single most commonly reported activity at the time of accidents (CMVIS casualty data)39.
Only 3 percent of accidents are attributed to either moving an item or attempting
to destroy it. Given that intentional play is the most commonly reported activity, it is not
surprising that almost half of all uxo casualties involve children. In fact in a number of
provinces, child casualties arising from intentional handling of UXO are at least double,
if not three times the number of incidents reported among adults.

38
39

Ninety-one percent based on aggregated CMVIS data for 2001-2005
The report suggests that there may well be several concurrent motivations behind “play”, such as to sell
the items for scrap afterwards, which are not fully investigated by CMVIS. Equally, that some activities
such as burning or throwing the device, may be mistakenly categorized as “play”, whereas they are
actually done to render the device safe for salvaging.
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Figure 6 - Trends in Mine/UXO Casualties Compared to Casualties Attributed to
Intentional Handling
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This phenomenon is common across all ERW affected areas, with child incidence
rates being almost identical in the north-west and north-east (46 percent in the N/NE to
48 percent in the NW). More disturbingly, Kandal, Kompong Thom, Krong Pailin and
Pursat have all seen significant increases in child UXO casualty rates over the past three
years (ranging from 58 percent -128 percent), indicating that trends are most likely still
yet to peak.
Figure 7 - Geographic Distribution of All UXO Casualties Compared to UXO Handling
Victims
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One of the principal differences between mine and UXO contamination relates to
the nature of people’s interaction with the respective threat. By far the majority of mine
casualties result from people unintentionally triggering a device, most often while
traveling through unfamiliar areas clearing land, foraging and collecting firewood. To
some extent, the risk associated with these activities can be offset through learning to
better interpret the environment (by way of warning clues) and adopt safer practices.
Modifying intentional behaviour on the other hand is much more difficult and
requires a markedly different approach to simple awareness raising and generic risk
education. This is particularly pertinent to certain population groups such as soldiers or
ex-combatants who make up the majority of tampering casualties resulting from fishing
with explosives or refashioning devices. The study concludes there is strong evidence of
a link between engagement in high-risk activities and a “…cultural background of
familiarity with ordnance and acceptance of high-risk behaviours.” Addressing these
features will require more intensive and targeted behaviour change interventions than are
currently offered.
One final note from the Tampering study is the observation that in villages where
incidents had occurred as a result of intentional handling, 83 percent only recorded one
such accident within the last five years. In fact, only 100 villages in the whole country
have had more than one “tampering” accident over the same period years and only 33
villages have experienced more than two accidents. Although the study cautioned that it
was not possible to assert, “…that the occurrence of an accident reduces deliberate
handling practices”, it observed that villagers interviewed during the study “…frequently
reported that handling of live ordnance had declined subsequent to the occurrence of
accidents.” This feature also lends support to the need for more participatory and iterative
approaches to awareness raising, and more importantly, integrating behaviour change
strategies within generic community risk education.
Interface between Poverty and Tampering
Harvesting of ERW for sale onto the scrap metal trade has been occurring for a
number of years. Its role in the economies of rural communities varies considerably from
village to village and from household to household. As the Tampering study identified,
its importance depends “…upon the economic base of village (availability of rice and
chamkar land) and the relative value of scrap metal (as defined above in terms of
difficulty to collect, price and market integration) by comparison with other locally
available resources.” Another feature that the study identified was the changing
importance of scrap metal as a commodity, relative to the development of a community’s
economic base. That is, that the economic importance of scrap metal appears to diminish
as economies of village communities mature and diversify.
Overall, the study concludes that salvaging from live ordnance is a marginal
economic activity in most rural household economies. Where the study did find that it
played a more significant role was in the economies of children. This observation is also
made in Bottomley’s work, “Crossing the Divide: Landmines, Villagers and
Organisations”. In this, she reports “villagers often described the selling of mines for
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scrap metal as an activity carried out by children, who were then able to buy candy with
the money.”
As the Tampering study notes “…many playing” accidents are likely to result
from contact with items that children have picked up because of their potential scrap
value. This is particularly true with respect to separated fuses which children seem to
identify less easily as dangerous.” The study reported that some 65% of children
interviewed drew upon scrap metal as a source of additional income and scrap metal
alone was the single most prominent source of cash for children. The extent to which
children utilize scrap metal is very important in understanding their contact with
ordnance and designing subsequent behaviour change interventions.
Informal Village Demining
The villager deminer who clears his own land for a homestead and then helps his
neighbor will remain a daily activity in the foreseeable future. Entrepreneurial village
deminers clearing land for profit will also remain a commercial activity that has a market
for people either living in mined or suspected areas. Recent, studies of village demining
is complete, this issue has been professional documented by HIB (Bottomley, 2003).
Other studies have raised the issue in a contentious manner accusing national service
providers of neglecting the village deminer and his achievements (Fleisher, 2005). This
has created controversy over legitimizing informal village demining.
The notion of accrediting work by unregistered, untrained, under equipped
villagers is a stretch for any governmental organization to undertake. In Cambodia,
considerable effort has been made to legislate and regulate ownership of weapons and
access to munitions. Giving license for citizens to collect explosive remnants of war
contradicts existing laws regulating weapons and munitions (RGC, 2005b). It cannot be
legitimate to have a grenade in your possession because of your efforts to clear your
neighbours land and meanwhile eligible to be arrested for possessing an illegal AK 47.
At the moment informal village deminers are not criminalized nor are the police
actively looking for these individuals and stopping their activities. Likewise, CMAA is
making no attempts to either criminalize or legitimize village demining, a state of
impasse exists on this issue.
The best outcome for including the efforts of informal village demining is to
incorporate the village deminer as a key informant in advanced technical survey
operations supporting area reduction. Village deminers can provide valuable information
on their operations, including location, density and types of munitions located. This
information would directly support service provider technical survey, area reduction and
mine clearance resources to target actual contaminated areas in a win-win situation.
Extended effort to legalize or license village deminers detracts from the real needs of
mine action service providers to enhance their area reduction operations.
Scrap Metal Collection
The increasing price of scrap metal on the world market creates an insatiable
demand for ERW materials. Regionally, this demand is driven by China’s growth and
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requirement for steel to support construction booms. Changing this economic dynamic is
not possible; scrap metal collection is lucrative for desperately poor rural people. A clear
example is the long-standing scrap metal business in Vietnam where the authoritarian
government has not been able to control its proliferation.
Police sweep operation that arrest or criminalizes scrap metal collectors would not
solve the situation. Rather, the best use of the scrap metal collection network is
identification of ERW collection areas, controlling dangerous collection practices, and
removing existing hazardous material on a routine basis. Developing an environment of
trust that results in scrap metal collectors routinely calling the national police, CMAC and
NGO’s to perform a hazardous material removal service and handing back safe scrap is
an achievable objective using existing resources.
Cambodia will not be able to control the spread or increase in this business as
regional appetites for iron and steel increase. The best result of donor intervention would
be training EOD teams to handle cleanup operations in scrap metal yards in collaboration
with national police support. Incorporating the CMBRR & CBURR network to include
reporting on scrap metal collection would allow Technical Survey Teams and EOD teams
to deliver services at collection points.

Essential Components (Needs) of a Cambodian National ERW Response
National ERW Sector Good Governance & Legal Framework
An essential dimension of mine action is promoting the development of an
appropriate legislative and legal framework. This should cover regulation of ERW
Response, compliance with international treaties, conventions and other multi-lateral
agreements prohibiting the use of landmines and cluster munitions, and ideally, domestic
control and management of weapons, explosives and munitions. According to a study of
mine action legislation conducted by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD) in 200440, Cambodia was among one of the few countries reviewed
that has pursued such a comprehensive legislative response.
The Geneva study did however note that Cambodian law needed to be revised to
reflect changes in CMAC’s status following the creation of the Cambodian Mine Action
and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), as well as remove contradicting and
overlapping provisions concerning the control of arms and explosives. The passing of
several sub-decrees delineating the role and responsibilities of the CMAA and amending
those of CMAC, as well as introduction of a new law governing the control and
management of weapons, explosives and munitions have largely resolved most of these
issues. It does however appear that the new law may not come into effect until several
articles pending definition by sub-decree are finalized. The only remaining issue
identified is the need to include clauses on clarification procedure with reference to
Article 8 of Ottawa Convention.
40

“A Study of the Development of National Mine Action Legislation”, GICHD, Geneva, November 2004
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Legislation Governing Control of Weapons, Explosives and Munitions
One of the first comprehensive laws concerning the control of weapons,
explosives and munitions in Cambodia was legislation passed in April 1999 prohibiting
the use of all anti-personnel mines41. Before this the legal environment comprised a series
of discreet laws and decrees pertaining to various aspects of weapons control and
management introduced throughout the course of 1998.
The most recent, the Law on Management of Weapons, Explosives and Munitions
establishes the legal framework for the management of all kinds of weapons, explosives
and munitions in the Kingdom of Cambodia42. Based on a comprehensive draft
developed by EU-ASAC program43 in cooperation with the Working Group for Weapons
Reduction, Ministry of Interior and the National Commission for the Management and
Reform of Weapons and Explosives in Cambodia, the law replaces Sub-Decree 38,
introduced in 1998. It is understood, however that as several provisions of the latest law
are still pending definition by Sub-Decree, it is not yet in force, and that Sub-Decree 38
may well still apply.
This latest law vests legal competence for the management, security, storage,
transport, decommissioning and destruction of all kinds of weapons, explosives and
munitions in the Kingdom of Cambodia to the Ministry of National Defense- RCAF and
the Ministry of Interior (in respect to the National Police, public institutions, officials and
civil individuals) [Chapter 2, Articles 9, 10, 11]. Legal competence for the import,
export, production and repair of all kinds of weapons, explosives and munitions is vested
in the RCAF [Article 8, Chapter 3]. Each Ministry has the legal competence to issue
Certificates of Authorization to use all kinds of weapons, explosives and munitions
[Chapter 2, Article 11].
The law applies to all kinds of weapons that can be used to injure people or
damage property, as well as all kinds of explosives and munitions, including those
containing chemical or biological agents, capable of causing danger to people’s lives,
property and the environment (Chapter 1, Article 3)44. It specifically prohibits the
equipping, owning, carrying, use, buying, selling, trading, loan, renting, transfer,
distribution, production, installation, repair, recycling, transport, import, export and

41

This same legislation authorized CMAC to “…coordinate all mine action activities, control all types of
anti-personnel mines and coordinate with all state institutions in order to fulfill the obligation of the
Kingdom under international treaties, conventions, agreements or other legal instruments”. Source: “A
Study of the Development of National Mine Action Legislation”, GICHD, Geneva, November 2004.
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Approved by the National Assembly on 26 April 2005 and the Senate on 12 May 2005

43

EU-Assistance on Curbing Small Arms and Light Weapons in Cambodia

44

Certain categories of pseudo firearms and munitions such as those used in sporting events or art
performances, firearms and paint/dye munitions used to mark targets and firing devices for pyrotechnics
are exempt from the law, as are explosives used for public service and civil engineering purposes.
(Chapter 2, Article 5)

58

storage of all kinds of weapons, explosives and munitions by non-authorized civil
individuals (Chapter 2, Article 4).
Penalties for breeches of the law range from 3 months to one year imprisonment,
accompanied by fines from 200,000 to one million Riel to five to ten years imprisonment.
Breaking the law includes, not reporting loss of weapon, falsification of Certificates of
Authorization, unauthorized possession of all kinds of weapons, explosives and
munitions by foreigners and unauthorized import, export, storage or transport of all kinds
of weapons, explosives and munitions.
It appears from reading of the law that historic artefacts, whether weapons,
explosives or munitions are not covered until in the physical possession of an
unauthorized civil individual. Salvage of all kinds of weapons, explosives or munitions,
whether contemporary or historic artefacts, is clearly prohibited.
Legislation Governing Management, Regulation and Representation of Mine Action
There are several pieces of legislation governing the management, regulation and
representation of mine action in Cambodia. These comprise the 1999 legislation, which
along with prohibiting the use of anti-personnel mines also defines the mandate and
authority of CMAC. In September 2000, Royal Decree No. 177 was passed establishing
the CMAA as the national mine action authority. Later, Royal Decree NS/RKT/0801/264
passed in August 2001, revised the legal status of CMAC and transferring policy and
regulatory responsibility to the CMAA, accompanied by several other Sub-Decrees
articulating the organization and functioning of the national authority (CMAA).
Other major pieces of legislation governing the management or regulation of mine
action in Cambodia are two sub-decrees concerning “Social Land Concessions” and
“Socio-economic Management of Mine Clearance Operations” introduced in March 2003
and September 2004 respectively. The first five Cambodian Mine Action Standards
(CMAS) have been legally ratified and recently passed into law which include;
Application of the Standards; Accreditation and Licensing; Monitoring of Mine Action
Operations; Storage, Transport and Handling of Explosives; Occupational Health and
Safety /Reporting and Investigation of Demining Incidents.
Establishment of a National Regulatory Body
Up until late 2000, implementation and enforcement of all mine action legislation
in Cambodia was vested with the Supreme Governing Council of CMAC. In September
2000 however, the Royal Government passed legislation to enable the creation of an
independent national regulator, the CMAA. This move ostensibly separated mine action
service provision from mine action regulation. As with some other national regulatory
authorities, the CMAA is not located under a line ministry but attached to the Council of
Ministers.
The Royal Decree issued in September 2000, delineates the roles and
responsibilities of the CMAA as:
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a. Development of policies on mine action and UXO clearance and
assistance to victims;
b. coordination of all mine action and UXO clearance and assistance to
victims;
c. mobilization of technical and financial resources within Cambodia and
abroad;
d. accreditation and licensing of national and international demining
operators working in Cambodia;
e. managing a database on mine action and UXO clearance;
f. development of policy on the use of demined land; and
g. implementation in Cambodia of the Ottawa Convention on land mines.
A further sub-decree detailing the organization and the functioning of the new
mine action authority was introduced in August 200145. The CMAA is presided over by
the Prime Minister, with the Senior Minister in charge of the Council of Ministers as its
Vice-President and a high-ranking official as its Secretary-General. The Authority
comprises representatives from five senior ministries and several other key government
bodies. It has a Standing Committee comprising the President, Vice-President and
Secretary-General. A Secretariat General, headed by the Secretary-General however,
manages day-to-day business of the Authority.
The Secretariat General of the CMAA currently comprises six departments
covering the following functions: legislation, regulation and monitoring; socio-economic
planning and database management; victim assistance; coordination and public relations;
administration, personnel and logistics; and finance. To all intents and purposes, CMAA
responsibilities in respect to victim assistance have been passed to the Ministry of Social
Affairs, Veterans and Youth Rehabilitation and the NGO sectoral body, the Disability
Action Council.
Two recent evaluations of the Cambodian mine action sector, and one of CMAA
itself highlight a number of constraints impacting the Authority’s ability to effectively
perform some of its key functions46. One evaluation concluded that “…as designed the
CMAA has too many responsibilities, some of which overlap with other agencies” and
“…other more appropriate agencies should be directly tasked to carry out activities that
have a mine action aspect, but are more appropriately theirs. These activities include
mapping, land policy, land allocation and land titling (Ministry of Land Management);
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Source: “A Study of the Development of National Mine Action Legislation”, GICHD, Geneva,
November 2004.
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“Evaluation of the Technical Assistance Project for the Development of the Cambodian Mine Action and
Victim Assistance Authority”, and “Review of the Mine Action Sector in Cambodia for the European
Commission”: both by Wilson. M; Phnom Penh, Cambodia; December 2003; and “Joint Evaluation of
Mine Action in Cambodia for the Donor Working Group on Mine Action”: Griffin. R, Keeley. R; Phnom
Penh, Cambodia. December, 2004.
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mine risk education (Ministry of Public Health); and victim assistance (Disability Action
Council)47.
The evaluation went on to suggest that the CMAA’s focus should be reduced to a
several core activities such as policy-making, resource mobilization, preparation of
annual reports, and establishing standards for example. Following the suggestions and
recommendations by donors the RGC took action to reform and restructure the CMAA
secretariat, as a result, two royal decrees have been revised and one sub decree amended.
A Technical Working Group comprising of the donors and key ministries has also been
set up chaired by HE Prak Sokhon as a 2nd vice chairman of CMAA.
Similar observations concerning the outsourcing of some of the Authority’s
current responsibilities were also made in an evaluation of EC support to the CMAA. In
that report, the author claims that there was no formal external QA or accreditation input
from the CMAA and that he did not believe the Authority had the competencies to issue
clearance certification or properly accredit operators. The evaluation went on to
recommend:
a. The provision, by contract, of an organization to provide accreditation,
licensing and quality assurance services to CMAA.
b. The appointment of a Senior Management Advisor to carry out a needs
assessment, set up administrative systems, develop personnel policies,
revue and produce relevant position descriptions and develop appropriate
management practices for CMAA48.
In view of these appraisals, UNDP has included technical support for two of the
CMAA’s departments under its new-pooled funding arrangement, “Clearing for Results
Project - 2006”. Support to the Socio-Economic Planning and Database Department will
focus on strengthening monitoring of Provincial Mine Action Committees and Mine
Action Planning Units, further developing site selection and prioritization procedures and
building capacity in post-clearance impact assessment and analysis. Support to the
Legislation, Regulation and Monitoring Department will focus on strengthening
accreditation procedures, monitoring operator performance and finalizing the remaining
Cambodian Mine Action Standards (CMAS). Significant support will also be channelled
to developing performance-based staff management systems within both departments.
Enforcement
Implementation of laws and decrees governing the control and management of
weapons falls to the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Interior.
Responsibility for their enforcement however lies with the National Police. In order to
ensure appropriate enforcement of the new law on the control and management of
47

“Joint Evaluation of Mine Action in Cambodia for the Donor Working Group on Mine Action”: Griffin.
R, Keeley. R; Phnom Penh, Cambodia. December, 2004.
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Source: “Evaluation of the Technical Assistance Project for the Development of the Cambodian Mine
Action and Victim Assistance Authority”: Wilson. M; Phnom Penh, Cambodia; December 2003
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weapons, senior RCAF and National Police personnel need to be inducted to the new
legislation and their respective forces briefed on its implementation.
One of the most pressing issues affecting the enforcement of mine action
legislation in Cambodia concerns the introduction of national mine action standards.
Despite the CMAA being presented a comprehensive draft of the standards in 2002, only
five of them have been subsequently ratified and only recently passed into law. Without
national standards and guidelines being in place, most of the regulatory functions are
conducted in an ad hoc or interim basis.
Operators for example, have been provided interim accreditation and licenses
from the Director-General. Some technical monitoring of operations has been conducted
only with CMAC, MAG and HALO Trust against each agency’s own rather than any
uniform national benchmarks such as standards and guidelines. While the use of such
temporary arrangements is understandable, it is important that CMAA implement a full
complement of Cambodian Mine Action Standards (CMAS) as soon as practicable rather
than waiting for ratification of the entire framework.
Cambodian Mine Action Standards (CMAS)
The study team reviewed the CMAS documentation completed by UNDP with
MAG technical advisory support in 2002. Initially written at a time when the
international standards and guidelines first became available from the Geneva Center for
Humanitarian Demining based of sector norms from the 2000-2001 period. The CMAS
documentation no longer reflect contemporary conditions in Cambodia and requires
revision. Since, the first publication of International Mine Action Standards and
Guidelines (IMAS) there has been a number of revisions and additions to these
international protocols and norms. Additionally, CCW protocols defining Explosive
Remnants of War (ERW) have changed influencing how mine action and ERW will be
implemented in the future.
Viewed in a contemporary context of an evolutionary transformation from mine
action to ERW response, it is prudent to review existing CMAS documentation changing
its fundamental premise to reflect a long-term ERW response. This will require bringing
together national and international expertise with Mine Action and ERW in a Cambodian
context into a Technical Review Board. The purpose of the Technical Review Board
would be the guidance, development and delivery of an set of standards and guidelines
addressing the full requirements of mine action and explosive remnants of war response.
Owing to the advanced nature of development of the current CMAS
documentation with its Khmer translation, this work should take no longer than six
months to complete. To avoid further unnecessary delays implementing national
standards and guidelines the completed work should be made available to the ERW
sector as an interim protocol allowing service providers opportunity to adjust and
comply.
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ERW Role Definition
Although a series of decrees and sub-decrees provides a firm foundation for
governance of the sector and clear delineation between the roles of CMAA and CMAC is
established, other stakeholders such as the National Police and RCAF require definition.
Cambodia’s active mine action community operates in an open opportunistic
environment. This is positive advantage enables humanitarian and development work to
proceed practically unimpeded. However, as other government agencies start developing
their place in the mine action and ERW sector overlapping roles and duplication of effort
is occurring particularly between government agencies.
The wide spectrum of the ERW problem facing Cambodia offers scope to divide
the problem/issues into manageable components. Coordination is fundamental for an
integrated government response and structuring the future roles and responsibilities. The
realisation of full RGC fiscal ownership of this sector by 2015 demands definition of
government roles and responsibilities, as early as possible.
Additionally, the interaction between aid agencies such as World Bank, ADB, and
bi-lateral donors supporting mine action through development programs is unclear. Direct
funding to ministries that result in mine clearance contracts to support development
projects occur without CMAA oversight. The lack of inter-agency coordination and
technical guidance in these large-scale development projects undermines effective
coordination of limited resources for mine action or ERW Response. Definitions of ERW
roles are necessary for good governance and effective strategic and operational response
to the ERW problem in Cambodia.
Role Duplication National Police & RCAF
Recent RCAF and National Police interests and contribution to the mine action
sector have led to much discussion on how these government organizations might assume
greater roles in the sector. Suggestions in other assessment reports have pointed towards
using the military and police in similar EOD roles as seen in Europe or North America.
These concepts are presented without “on the ground” knowledge of real RCAF and
National Police status and capacities.
Firstly, the National Police are well suited to increasing their networking role at
the commune level and strengthening their traditional law enforcement role to protect
civil society. The National Police have appropriately indicated the need for a “Bomb
Squad” capacity, which is arguably a traditional police role that should be pursued to a
level thought necessary in the Cambodian context.
Increasing the National Police role, as suggested in the Ministry of Interior “Pilot
Project” to develop EOD capacity and operations in five provinces is a duplication of
resources already in place with CMAC and NGO’s. This recent pilot project proposed by
the National Police has is not part of an integrated planning process coordinated through
the Council of Ministers.
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Similarly, the RCAF capacity to transform from traditional defence roles to mine
action, EOD/BAC humanitarian and development capacities is not possible from a
standing start. RCAF does not have institutional depth; troops do not have the training,
equipment, necessary skills, management ability or knowledge to undertake full national
mine action and ERW responsibilities at this time.
Developing RCAF into a fully capable organization would require a decade of
training and development support. Military units are never static, staff changes occur
annually, and engineering units constantly change location and roles. Developing a
military organization is a longer-term activity involves strong infrastructure and training
support. Neither the infrastructure or training facilities with experienced mine action nor
EOD instructional staff exists in RCAF, developing the necessary human resources and
developing a training facility would have to be created from scratch49.
Judging by current cleared land estimates by mine action service providers the
priority-mined areas will be completely reduced within a decade. Developing another
organization to meet these targets for the same priority mined areas would be a huge
duplication, without changing the outcome. Therefore developing a large RCAF
demining force as requested, to meet this need would be a redundant exercise.
Investment in training for RCAF to meet national standards and norms would
strengthen its managerial and operational capacity. Training and equipping RCAF must
be balanced against real needs, which according to this analysis should be a supportive
role in mine action. Determining the end state requirements according to a National ERW
Strategy and fitting a role for the military is crucial to aligning their contributions into a
cohesive national plan.
Recent, deployment of an RCAF Demining Unit (135 men) stripped the military
of its best people and forced a quick procurement of the equipment necessary to meet the
UN requirements. When this unit returns it will undoubtedly bring experience back to
Cambodia that will be useful for supporting RCAF mine action operations on rural road
construction. However, a real risk exists that these soldiers will return to garrison duties
without utilizing their skills because no equipment or operational funds are allocated to
support this resource.
However, the reality is RCAF contributes to clearance of rural roads throughout
Cambodia, and is increasing becoming a member of the mine action community, albeit
below national standards. There are three value-added contributions that RCAF can
provide to the sector that are within their current capacity to develop.
a. RCAF intimate knowledge of the mine laying plans during past conflicts
and their ability to provide qualitative information on the locations of the
remaining mine contamination along the K5 barrier and other areas in
Cambodia. Information from RCAF resources, currently serving staff,
former combatants and former allies involved in the mine laying and
defensive plans could be gathered, and collated into a usable product to
support national mine action operations.
49

RCAF Engineering School is located at Odong, lacks proper training facilities for mine action operations.
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b. Enhancing RCAF existing rural road clearance capacity to meet
acceptable national standards for clearance, and reporting.
c. Develop the capacity to destroy bulk munitions and small arms destruction
would be useful contributions to de-militarizing the national and removing
hazardous materials from populated areas.
Pursuing this vital mine contamination information is a national priority.
Potentially this would be a major RCAF contribution to the nation and an epic
contribution populating the national database with enhanced information. Additionally,
the training, equipping of existing RCAF demining teams to undertake their current
operations in safety and producing quality work clearing rural routes would be an
achievable RGC contribution. These three roles can be achieved without creating largescale organizations while complimenting rather than duplicating existing national mine
action resources and services.
Likewise, enhanced traditional roles for the National Police would be an
appropriate first phase to developing positive contributions to a National ERW Strategy.
The Nation Police network for reporting at the commune level is an example of beneficial
police work and their aspirations to develop a “Bomb Squad” would service other
national security needs.

Profiling ERW Threat, Impact, and Risk
The definition of acceptable risk and impact is fundamental to developing a risk
response plan that addressing the needs of communities and national development goals.
Threat and Impact Analysis
The full scope of the ERW threat facing Cambodia is still only partially
understood. Threat and impact analysis has occurred at different junctures of mine action
development in Cambodia; however, there has been little follow through or knowledge
capitalization.
Landmines have received the greatest attention of the technical experts. Landmine
threats are identified; technical solutions crafted through a marriage of technology and
common sense procedures on the ground to deal with the most difficult landmine threats
in Cambodia. Thorough technical analysis has characterised the landmine threat into
various components such as, minimal metal mines in ferrous soil, beneath a jungle
overburden i.e. Type 72A Chinese anti-personnel mine. A combined solution integrating
armoured mechanical brush cutters enabling access through thick tropical forest, then the
application of explosive detecting dogs, combined with manual deminers using sensitive
ground compensating minimal metal detectors addresses the majority of Cambodia’s
landmine threat.
The threat of stepping on a landmine is easily imaginable and its threat perceived
or actual causes a fear reaction. Other explosive remnants of war do not create the same
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threat perception and consequently are considered less dangerous. The remaining ERW
comprises a vast array of explosive hazards such as; land service munitions, air-dropped
munitions and dioxin contamination which the public is now learning actually threaten
life and limb to a greater degree that the receding landmine threat in Cambodia.
Many factors influence whether an explosive device will cause loss of life or
limb. These include the munitions type, fuze type, condition, length of time exposed to
the elements and location. A detailed review technical data available in national/operator
databases combined with operator knowledge and experience is necessary to develop a
“threat profile” of the different explosive hazards in Cambodia’s diverse environment.
Recent shifts in funding from humanitarian to development priorities is
increasingly directing landmine orientated resources to use the same technologies and
methodologies in less threatening environments. Simply, development agencies are
requesting the same level of assurance experienced in landmine clearance operations for
other areas where only unexploded ordnance are expected or encountered.
This trend will increase exponentially as the landmine threat diminishes and other
lands open to development. An understanding of threat and impact is required by national
and international planning and policy makers to properly use the limited mine action and
ERW resources available to the maximum benefit.
BAC operations to remove abandoned ordnance and unexploded ordnance at less
threatening to operators than removing landmines which are victim activated. A different
technical approach is possible that is less stringent and time consuming of traditional
mine clearance methods. These methodologies for technical survey and clearance of
abandoned ordnance and uxo are being trialed in Laos where lessons can be learned on
these best practices.
Also, is the threat of dioxin poisoning caused by residual herbicides used during
the Vietnam war to defoliate areas where guerrilla forces found sanctuary. Documented
evidence of herbicide spraying over rubber plantations in eastern Cambodia exist,
however these threats and geographic areas are not fully researched or mapped.
The State Department inspection team of Drs. C.E. Minarik, Fred
Tschirley, and two others confirmed the extent of the damage to 173,000
acres (7% of Kompong Cham province), 24,700 of them seriously affected.
The rubber plantations totaled approximately one-third of Cambodia’s
total and represented a loss of 12% on the country’s export earnings…
(Wells-Dang, 2002)
It is notable that these threats directly affect the lives of local Cambodian peoples
and deminers of ERW Response personnel who work in dioxin-contaminated areas.
Other documented evidence is available on the effects of dioxin poisoning and how
demining practices can be adjusted to reduce risk to personnel engaged in clearance
operations (Hatfields, 2000). These risks must be considered in combination to determine
the level of threat exposed to the population and ERW operational staff.
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Defining Impact
Once, actual or perceived threats have been determined these factors can then be
compared against their socio-economic and environmental impact on Cambodians living
in these hazardous areas. The definition of impact must be articulated in such a way to
encompass the diverse levels of explosive and chemical threats and how these impact
daily lives of Cambodians. Measuring these threats and impact together in the context of
a poor rural society exploiting its natural resources and agricultural land is fundamental
to designing and ERW response.
The L1S used impact criterion to determine the level of intensity landmines and
uxo had on Cambodian communities. These impacts were mostly measured in terms of
denial of access to land, water and other facilities such as roads, markets, etc. The L1S
also captured the concerns of villagers living in proximity to airdropped munitions in
eastern Cambodia. The documented interviews and village mapping of these areas is
invaluable to determining an effective response relieving the impact of airdropped
munitions on these villages. Clearly, these villagers articulated the affects of ERW on
their lives; these qualitative and quantitative measures are a clear reference point for
defining impact.
The national strategy discusses elimination of all high impact mined areas before
2015, however neglects to define both impact and high priority. This definition is left for
operators on the ground to determine and consequently enormous debate ensures over
how to apply limited response and development aid in the best way.
The impact imperative has shifted from humanitarian response to a development
response. This paradigm shift is occurring at a rapid rate ahead of the national service
providers ability to respond or change direction. The rapid reclamation of previously
suspected mined area is making mine clearance redundant in some areas.
A definition of impact is necessary for national service providers to orientate their
resources and efforts to limit threats and impact to the Cambodian population.
Acceptable Risk
Landmines have been determined by Cambodians and the international
community as an “unacceptable risk” for people to be exposed. As the landmine problem
is reduced to remote border areas, the question of “acceptable risk” for the remaining
ERW contamination must be measured so a responsible National ERW program can be
designed for this lasting threat.
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It is “acceptable risk” for farmers in northwest Europe to cultivate potatoes and
sugar beets in former World War I & II battlefields where each year their ploughs pull up
“Mustard Gas Shells”. European farmers are allowed access to these highly contaminated
former battlefields where tons of munitions are recovered annually by ERW Response
teams.
After the major conflicts in Europe ended, governments made decisions that
allowed local populations to use land highly contaminated with uxo. Provisions were
made for a ERW response dealing with munitions found and education for people who
lived in these areas. The result is a population living with ERW and prospering without
undue threat to life or limb and impact on their daily lives.
The experience of peoples living in SE Asia in similar condition where their lands
are heavily contaminated with air-dropped munitions and residual dioxin contamination
is only now being investigated. Some research has occurred in SE Asia such as PDR Laos
on the social-economic impact of living with uxo (Handicap-International, 1997).
More frightening is the field research in Vietnam on the effects of dioxin
poisoning on local populations and the impact on deminers and their methods working in
contaminated areas.
In many areas of southern Viet Nam, landmine and UXO clearance
activities may be occurring in chemically contaminated soils; of particular
concern are soils contaminated by dioxins as a result of historical
applications of Agent Orange herbicide. Aside from chronic exposure
problems for local inhabitants, the existence of chemical contaminants can
result in acute exposure risks to UXO/landmine clearance crews and
support workers. Unexploded ordnance, landmines, and chemical
contamination are insidious threats that create an atmosphere of fear and
uncertainty among local residents, which ultimately inhibits rehabilitation
and agricultural/economic development of impacted lands (Hatfields,
2003).
These studies are invaluable start points to develop a ERW and dioxin poisoning
threat profile to determine what is “acceptable risk” for Cambodians living in these
hazardous areas. The combination of threat, impact and risk analysis paves the way to
developing a comprehensive Risk Management strategy.

ERW Risk Management
Comprehensive understanding of threats, impacts and acceptable risk creates a
knowledgeable environment for designing risk management structures to address the
prime ERW issues affecting Cambodia. Risk management is a series of activities that
identifies threats, impact and determines a response with an ability to monitor and control
risk.
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Cambodian mine action has evolved into a Risk Management structure over time
rather than through a specific design owing to its transition through peacekeeping,
emergency, humanitarian and development phases. As the risks for society change with
the success of landmine removal operations, the opportunity to design a Risk
Management approach to the ERW sector of the future is now.
An example of prime components of risk management are:
a. Risk Identification,
b. Qualitative Risk Analysis,
c. Quantitative Risk Analysis,
d. Risk Response Planning, and
e. Risk Monitoring and Control (Duncan, 1996) .
This type of program design is entirely possible at the national level in Cambodia.
Starting with the threat profile and impact analysis, acceptable risk definition are the
main entry points for “Risk Identification”. “Qualitative and Quantities Risk Analysis”
can be achieved by through examination of the various data sources already available to
national service providers. The objective is to decide the probability and impact of risk
presented by the various threat exposures to the Cambodian population.
“Risk Response Planning” is an analytical process to determine how threats/risk
can be addressed through various risk mitigation techniques or procedures such as
education, training, detection and disposal operations. Finally, “Risk Monitoring and
Control” is essentially the tracking/monitoring of risk and effectiveness/quality of risk
mitigation operations.
A comprehensive national strategy requires a well thought out “ERW Risk
Management Plan” as a fundamental component to create a clear focus for agencies to
execute professional ERW responses.
Information & Knowledge Management
Cambodia is data rich and information poor which results in knowledge
depreciation. Constant reference is made to “databases” that apparently hold all manner
of information within where knowledge is shared and delivered in unbounded quantities.
The reality in Cambodia is very fragmented collection of databases spread between
several organizations. A recent review of Technical Survey operations by CMAC
concluded “…No valid central national database exists and reporting to CMAA is adhoc; i.e. no formal reporting process exists” (Morete & Lardner, 2006).
It has been the experience of this study team delving into various databases to
discover a wealth of data yet unexplored or exploited. National databases in Cambodia
can be characterized as repositories for loosely organized data pools. An example is the
CMAC database which is in the process of combining several databases; mine clearance
data, EOD data, US Bombing data, and CMAC assets deployment data.
Other studies have come to the same conclusion for example;
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That CMAA establish a national database populated through a formalised
and possibly legalised reporting processes from all operators. That a
donor be sought to fund a mine action information management consultant
(not a database specialist) to develop the systems and procedures required
of a national mine action database (Morete & Lardner, 2006).
The ultimate aspiration of any field is the development of wisdom. This is
attained through experiences and development of knowledge until all manner of a subject
or field is thoroughly understood. The process is clear as visualized in the figure 8, data is
organized, collated, analyzed and processed into information. These information products
become the basis for understanding a subject or field of inquiry. The analysis of
information products develops sector knowledge and expertise. The accumulation of
knowledge and its application creates a level of wisdom. Then the process starts all over
again, re-examining the premise of acquired knowledge and wisdom in a dynamic and
changing human environment.
Figure 8 - Development Process of Data - Information - Knowledge into Wisdom

Cambodia mine action is firmly attached to the data phase with a limited entry
into the information level of the field. This is primarily due to an unstructured
development process and limited “capitalization of knowledge and experience” of the
mine action sector. The “know-how” developed in Cambodia is not fully documented,
distributed and accessible through a central information resource center.
Knowledge Capitalization
A conscious management program to capitalize on information and knowledge is
the hallmark of effectiveness. This process requires development in Cambodia before the
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lessons learned in the mine action sector development erode away leaving the longer term
ERW Response sector the task of re-building.
Data pools are spread amongst CMAA, CMAC, RCAF, and the international
NGO’s. Bringing all these data assets together into a central CMAA data pool to form a
national archive is necessary to begin a knowledge capitalization process. Specifically,
planned information and knowledge management requires an audit of available data and
information. Once available data/information is centrally collated then a complete
analysis can be initiated to develop credible information products and synthesize
knowledge for the development of the ERW sector.
Knowledge capitalization must evolve and is never static this requires a
dedication to the development of a professional sector for ERW Response. Without a
demonstration of national will to capitalize on the experience/knowledge of Cambodian
mine action programs and international investments the likelihood of Cambodia
achieving self-sufficiency is doubtful.
ERW Center(s) of Excellence
National ERW Information Resource Center
Experience and skill in a variety of ERW activities is prevalent in Cambodia, yet,
the accompanying knowledge expected after over a decade of development has not fully
materialized. Information and knowledge cannot exist in a vacuum. Today, there in no
central location where mine action or ERW information can be found, each research
project or study must painstakingly develop relationships with a number of stakeholders
who will offer information in a piecemeal fashion.
Cambodia requires a central information/knowledge resource center where all,
technical, operational, managerial, archival, topographic, etc. resources are held for
development, distribution and archival purposes. This center must be staffed with
Cambodian that are not merely librarians but rather the most experienced and
knowledgeable people available to develop ERW information and knowledge for the
future of the sector.
Naturally, the national database and archive/library should be co-located in a
National ERW Information Resource Center. The Cambodian staff of this type of center
must be trained database specialists, GIS specialists, and information analysts working as
a dynamic team under a robust information management structure. A comprehensive
collection/collation and analysis plan that capitalizes on the wealth of data/information
existing in Cambodia must be developed to fill ERW knowledge gaps.
The purpose of the information resource center is to develop useable
information/knowledge products for the ERW sector for immediate application to
strategic plans, annual work plans and operational/technical planning. Also, this center
must be the workhorse recording, monitoring and quality checking data/information and
knowledge products provided through various service providers and other agencies.
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It is understood that data/information analytical capacities of Cambodia staff is
limited; this weakness merits the focus of development agencies to create that capacity to
strengthen Cambodia’s ability for moving towards a knowledge based ERW sector.
National ERW Training and R&D Center
The essence of a professional discipline is its ability to create a human resource
core of experts in a specific field. Normally, this is achieved through academic
institutions of technical schools. The ERW problem in Cambodia warrants a specialized
training, research & development center to meet the technical demands and ongoing
requirements of this discipline and professional field.
The existing mine action community and growing number of government
stakeholders (RCAF & National Police) combined with an expanding national
commercial sector justifies the requirement for a national center that caters to the ERW
community needs.
Bringing together experienced human capital into one common training facility is
the most efficient and effective method to service national requirements. Skills and
knowledge developed over a decade must be capitalized and shared amongst national
stakeholders to ensure self-sufficiency of the ERW sector. A National ERW Training
Center could incorporate the needs of all stakeholders and equally contributions to the
development of a national training capacity.
In the short term, the CMAC Training Center is the obvious choice to form the
basis for a National ERW Training Center with its classrooms, student accommodations,
instructional aids, training areas, warehouses, administrative offices and staff.
Incorporating National Police and RCAF instructor cadre into the school to both learn
and assist national training requirements would be a major step towards nationalizing the
ERW capacity.
A National ERW Training Center deliver the full spectrum mine action and ERW
curriculum building upon the current capacities of the CMAC training center.
Specifically, meeting the requirements for Advanced training in Battle Area Clearance
(BAC) and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) for integrated ERW operations.
The active nature of technology innovations brought to Cambodia for
experimentation and field trials warrants a national response to facilitate these cost
effective contributions. Technical trials in Cambodia are responsible for developing,
enhanced minimal metal mine detection, mechanical assistance and explosive detection
dog techniques. Cambodia has directly benefited from the results of these experiments
and field trials using these innovations. However, the knowledge capital gained from
these innovations remains offshore.
Creating a Research & Development Center that facilitates the introduction of
new technologies and methodologies would directly benefit professionalizing
Cambodia’s ERW sector. Allowing foreign investment a fast track avenue to experiment
and conduct field trials while sharing knowledge capitalization is a win-win strategy.
Most importantly, is the technical and knowledge transfer to the national service
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providers deepening their institutional depth and strength for long-term National ERW
programs.
Integration of ERW Operations
The lessons learned by the mine action community are transferable to developing
Integrated ERW Operations. Without question, the same principles of information
collection, task selection/prioritizations, operational planning, technical survey, MRE,
and mine clearance are applicable with modification to ERW operations.
However, some lessons are not readily apparent as witnessed in UXO Lao where
mine clearance procedures from the early 1990’s have not evolved to meet the real ERW
needs in Laos. Simply, UXO Lao is using antiquated mine clearance techniques to clear
uxo. After a decade of low productivity enhanced technical survey methods and a
systems approach to clearance is now being used to modernise and make efficient UXO
Lao operations.
Cambodia cannot afford to make this mistake and must develop specific
Advanced EOD/BAC operations to tackle its ERW problem. Current SOP’s for
EOD/BAC were developed in the context of supporting mine clearance programs.
Integrating the lessons learned through the development of information networks
(CBMRR & CBURR & National Police), analysis of contamination information
(bombing data), into advanced EOD/BAC procedures is a necessary transition from
“mine centric” operations to ERW Response operations.
EOD/BAC operations in Cambodia can be termed “reactive” in their response to
community needs and requests for support. This type of operation is efficient and
responsive to real-time community threats and impact of ERW. This capability needs to
continue and augmented by “pro-active” EOD/BAC operations.
Pro-active EOD/BAC operations are intended to relieve communities from ERW
threats by applying concentration of effort through sustained “blitz-type” operations, i.e.
surface and sub-surface clearance until all evidence of threats are removed. ERW
analysis identifies known highly contaminated areas and specifically targets these
communities for intensive operations. This type of operation will minimise the necessity
for repeated visits by “reactive” EOD/BAC teams in the same communities. “Reactive
EOD teams” could then focus on maintaining operational presence covering a wider area
of medium ERW contaminated communities.
All EOD teams in Cambodia are trained and equipped for light operations
identifying ordnance and disposal through demolition or removal. These operations are
generally limited to small scale ordnance. A requirement exist to train and equip a portion
of EOD teams to handle heavy tasks such as large air-dropped bombs and bulk munitions
demolitions. This expertise involves learning techniques to render safe munitions using
special equipment, explosives and techniques. Additionally, training is required to
develop a Cambodian capacity to dispose of bulk munitions causing extreme hazards in
government ammunition facilities and caches throughout the country.
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Scrap metal collection of hazardous explosive material will remain a problem for
communities. The solution to removing these hazards is joint National Police and EOD
service providers working together on a regular collection plan. The L1S identified scrap
metal dealers all over the country, this information combined with National Police
capacity to network at the commune level is the starting point for designing a response
plan. The key is national service provider integration working together on a risk
mitigation plan that creates a safer environment for communities and the scrap metal
trade.

End State Programming
Strategic Forecasting
The current estimates published by CMAA indicate that mine action agencies will
complete high priority minefields by 2015. The plan does not list or indicate which
minefields are targeted as “high priority” for clearance. The next milestone is 2020, the
period when Cambodia will be impact free; again impact is not well defined. There is no
plan outlining the expected activities or outcomes during the intervening period or
indication how service providers can contribute to strategic goals beyond 2015.
International NGO’s are predicting that major priority areas may be complete as
early as 5-10 years from now. Bearing in mind CMAC’s enhanced capability deploying
mechanized brush cutters, mine detection dogs and advanced Technical Survey Teams
focused on area reduction operations a productively level not yet fully realized, even a
five to ten year projection may be a conservative estimation.
The rapid reclamation of land in formerly suspected areas has overtaken the
capacity of mine clearance agencies to keep up to clearance demands. This massive shift
in land reclamation is making redundant the current national strategy. Additionally, the
massive ERW problem known to exist in eastern Cambodia is not quantified into the
strategic planning. Troubling is a lack of end state vision in view of these develops in the
sector.
International organizations are recognizing the changes in Cambodia and it is now
time for the national mine action service agencies to embrace a realistic projection of
requirements for mine clearance operations and make preparation for changes to
organizational structure that addresses the longer-term ERW roles.
End State Development
End State programming is a product of developing a strategic and operational
roadmap to reach a desired optimum outcome or vision. Definition of the Cambodia mine
action and ERW mine action end state is a function of combining a strategic vision with a
designed organizational structure, which matches the long-term requirements of the
sector.
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National mine action service providers must define their organizational end state
that meets the reality of a diminishing landmine problem and the requirement to address
the longer-term ERW issues. The End State is a national affair where the expectation is
total RGC ownership for the national ERW Response structure and operations. Without a
specific plan for an “End State” the current management of mine action or ERW
Response would not be credible.
The End State for National ERW Response should include:
a. Redefining the problem through information management, and area
reduction policy/procedures,
b. Re-orientate the existing organizational structure to finish the main task of
removing landmine threats using area reduction techniques, and
c. Build a national structure that can address the longer-term ERW threat.
The focus since 1992 has been landmine clearance, now mine action service
providers are visualizing the limits of the remaining contaminated areas. Analysis and
planning targeted operations can effectively diminish the landmine threat to manageable
proportions. Thus, leaving the long-term ERW problem to organizations designed to meet
the requirements of the impacted communities and the national development plan.
An example can be taken from the northwest Europe experience contaminated
with unexploded ordnance leftover from two world wars. The casualties from uxo are
minimal due to long-term education programs that have changed the behaviour of people
living in contaminated areas. Government EOD/BAC resources are available on call to
handle munitions discovered in communities as result of agriculture or construction
works. It is conceivable Cambodia will have a similar organizational structure and
capacity, albeit larger due to the extensive contamination from aerial bombardment.
End State programming is essential for the national mine action service providers
to create a ‘national’ sustainable organization to meet future requirements. An example
End State status; CMAA staffed by civil servants coordinating a network of government
institutions, CMAC, military, police and civil society ERW response resources. A
national budget process that providing the fuel to activate a National ERW Strategic Plan
supporting national development goals and objectives would finance these programs and
operations.

End State Transitions
Over a decade of international investment has created solid foundations for mine
action in Cambodia. CMAC’s capacity as an organization and achievements are a direct
result of government commitment and international support to the fundamental ideas of
mine action in Cambodia. Replicating this resource in other government agencies would
require the same amount of investment over a similar period. Therefore, it is in the best
interest of the RGC to capitalize on these investments in CMAA & CMAC by preparing
for the self-sufficiency of ERW Response for the future.
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The most valuable contribution of the RGC would be fully institutionalizing the
existing mine action structure, as a fist step towards national responsibility and ownership
of the ERW sector. CMAC is a government institution by decree, however not fully
assimilated into the government administration. Amalgamating CMAC into government
administration must be achieved through a phased transitional process, planned in such a
way that both operational objectives for mine clearance and ERW Response transition
occur in a smooth evolutionary process along with the retention of experienced staff.
The opportunity to meet the changing sector dynamics before mine action
resources become redundant for lack of real mine areas to clear, and the donor
community moves onto other pressing priorities is now. Planning a transition that
develops human resources and organizational structures for the future must start
immediately before events overtake the opportunity to craft the future.
Impact on National Development Plans
Attempting to estimate the impact of ERW contamination on Cambodia’s national
development is an immense task, requiring complex modeling of numerous interdependent variables across several key socio-economic domains. The impact on public
health and social welfare spending for example is one; the affects on rural workforce
participation, agricultural production and development of national and provincial
irrigation, power and transport infrastructure are others.
Such analysis clearly lies beyond the scope and expertise of this study. However,
there is one domain that can be relatively easily measured. That is the amount of overseas
development assistance committed to mine action. This in effect represents
supplementary monies added to national development targets as a direct result of ERW
contamination.
Some of this funding comprises of World Bank or ADB loans awarded for
national infrastructure development; other, bilateral Government and INGO assistance for
specific demining and development projects or generic mine action operations. While it is
possible to estimate the sum of the latter from NGO reports to the Cambodian Council for
Development (CDC); details of budgets allocated from WB and ADB loans are not in the
public domain.
It is well known, however that the RCAF Engineering Command has undertaken
clearance operations for companies awarded WB and ADB funded road construction
contracts. Historically, these have included work on Route 1(Phnom Penh to Vietnam),
Route 5 (Phnom Penh to Battambang, south of the Tonle Sap) and Route 6 (Phnom Penh
to Siem Reap, north of the Tonle Sap). More recently, the RCAF was sub-contracted to
provide clearance support for the rehabilitation of Route 7 (Stung Treung to the Laos
border). A study of the role of the military in mine action, conducted by the Geneva
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) in 2003, reports that the Royal
Cambodian Armed Forces Engineering Command estimated it had “…earned about
US$200,000 from commercial road projects”, but that no details were available.
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As a conservative estimate, some $3.75 million USD has been provided solely to
national development NGOs to procure mine action services over the past two years. If
all mine action funding is included, such as expenditure on national capacity
development, emergency risk reduction clearance and EOD operations, this figure jumps
to $36 million USD since 2004, with a further $18.6 million USD allocated for 2006.
Recent, National Police aspirations for a pilot project to support and EOD
capacity in five provinces adds another dimension to the assistance requirements in
Cambodia. Clearly, coordination of assistance requirements must be strengthened
through the Council of Ministers to ensure fiscal responsibility is focused on wellplanned and articulated National ERW Response requirements during the limited period
of remaining international support to RGC.
Conceivable, international contributions have peaked and remaining funding over
the next 10-year period will gradually reduce according to donor’s capacity for
contribution. RGC International loans are increasingly feeding the general development
sector, which in turn is becoming the trend for the ERW sector.
Developing an ERW End State program and plan would be beneficial for
integration into the RGC development plan. The current mine action level of resources
will not be sustainable either by loans or RGC funds to maintain for a decreasing need for
landmine clearance.
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PART III: STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS
Strategic Level
Overview
Recommendations of this report address the primary issues of ERW response
within national structures and interests. Taking into account contextual
international/national political and social-economic realities this study recommends
strategic, institutional and operational improvements that are achievable outcomes for the
ERW sector in Cambodia.
Framed within a diminishing landmine problem and receding international
support this study focused on recommendations that target solutions to achieve a
nationally sustainable ERW sector. Fixing time scales linked with government
development goals and existing CMAA objectives offers a framework to determine short,
medium, and long-term perspectives.
The Council of Ministers set the goal for national assimilation of fiscal
responsibility for the ERW sector at 2015. This key milestone marks the end of the
medium-term period and beginning of the Royal Government of Cambodia treasury
sustaining National ERW programs.
Strategic periods for national development of the ERW sector are as follows:
a. Short-Term 2006-2010 (4-years),
b. Medium-Term 2010-2015 (10-years), and
c. Long-Term 2015, (20-years) and beyond50.
A central theme to National strategic planning is end-state programming to
achieve a sustainable National ERW sector. Fundamental to sustainability is a strategic
vision, which includes the roles and goals for institutional and operational frameworks
necessary to implement Cambodia’s National ERW strategy.
During the short-term period CMAC, RCAF and National Police are moving
towards full maturity of their institutional and operational capacities to address the
landmine problems in northwest Cambodia. Conceivably, the short-term period until
2010 will witness the landmine problem largely resolved, creating a surplus of mine
clearance resources. These surplus resources will be required to address the longer-term
ERW issues.
This scenario creates a sense of urgency to re-orientate, re-train and re-equip mine
action resources before redundancy overtakes the sector. The aim of planning a nationally
sustainable ERW sector would be to ensure Cambodia has the capacity for the long-term
50

Long-Term ERW Response will extend for an indefinite period until ERW is no longer a threat in
Cambodia, similar to the experiences of North-west European countries after WWI & II.
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resolution of the ERW problem. Adopting “End State Planning” national sustainability is
achievable before the conclusion of the medium term period in 2015. The foundations for
long-term national responsibility meeting humanitarian and development imperatives,
can be prepared before 2015 by beginning the planning and transitional process in 2006.
The study recommendations are further categorized into Strategic, Institutional
and Operational levels that illustrate a way forward with practical measures towards
transitioning the MA sector into a fully-fledged National ERW sector.

Defined ERW Roles: Governance & Legislation
Through the legislative authority of the Council of Ministers, define the roles for
each of the national government and private sector stakeholders. In an interactive
strategic planning process coordinate ERW stakeholder roles and responsibilities, and set
guidelines for their contributions to international and national ERW Response capacities.
Establish defined roles for institutions to create an environment of positive cooperation
and focused use of the limited ERW Response resources.
•

Goal 1- Define National ERW Response Roles for each stakeholder (see
recommended roles).

•

Goal 2- Legislate guidelines for ERW Response Roles.

•

Goal 3- Provide environment for institutional transition into new ERW
Response Roles.

•

Goal 4- Assume national fiscal responsibility and governance from
national to municipal level for the ERW sector.

This process must be coordinated by the COM, framing the roles of each
stakeholder in a development process that allows maximum creative interaction between
agencies. The following roles are recommended to bring clarity for stakeholders engaged
in mine action and future ERW sector.

Recommended Roles
Council of Ministers (COM)

The COM should provide national oversight of the ERW sector inclusive of
national level strategic planning, legislation, budget allocation, and monitoring. Establish
the roles and guidelines for ERW stakeholders in the sector and provide an environment
for effective reduction of risk and impact associated with ERW contamination.
Cambodian Mine Action Authority (CMAA)

Executive coordination, monitoring and reporting body of the COM. The CMAA
ensures effective coordination of ERW stakeholders and resources in synchronisation
with National Strategic goals and objectives. CMAA monitors and reports the
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implementation of Annual Integrated ERW Work Plans and maintains a National ERW
Information Resource Center.
Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC)

National ERW service provider executing Annual Integrated ERW Work Plans
synchronised with National Strategic goals and objectives. Establish and maintain both
skill and knowledge level human resource capacity for long-term ERW Response.
Develop and maintain a National ERW Training and R&D Center to service the
professional needs of the ERW sector.
RCAF

Maintain the traditional National Defence roles supporting defence policies.
Represent National interests internationally with ERW Reponses capacity for UN
Peacekeeping and other external emergency, humanitarian or development responses.
Develop a National ERW Response capacity capable of conducting operations
supporting national development plans specifically in rural road and infrastructure
development.
Safe storage, control, security, and monitoring of national defence munitions
stocks for RCAF. Bulk munitions destruction of unneeded, expired, non-serviceable or
obsolete munitions including implementation of the AP Ban Treaty stockpile destruction
agreements.
National Police

Assume tradition National Police law enforcement role relative to weapons and
ERW issues in collaboration with National and International ERW stakeholders. Develop
a “Bomb Squad” capacity for national security requirements.
Develop and maintain a national ERW reporting structure that identifies the type,
and location of ERW reported by citizens down to commune level.
Provide Police support to ERW agencies in their EOD/BAC removal or
destruction operations. In particular, Police support for reducing risk in the scrap metal
trade, through interactive operations in collaboration with ERW service providers, scrapmetal dealers/collectors and communities.
International & National - NGO’s

The primary non-governmental organizational role is addressing emergency,
humanitarian and development ERW responses in sectors and geographic areas where the
national government is unable to respond in a timely manner or with the necessary
resources. Additionally, the NGO role is interactive national capacity development of the
ERW sector based on intrinsic professional expertise and experience.
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International & National - Commercial

Provide professional level ERW services based on national standards and
guidelines. Commercial operators are suited for supporting development related ERW
operations fully integrated into a National ERW framework responsive to national
standards and guidelines.

National ERW Information & Knowledge Management
Cambodia requires National ERW Information Management that benefits the
national interests and all stakeholders. A National ERW Information Resource Center
complete with clearinghouse for operational and archival information is necessary to
meet this requirement. Develop central information collection, collation, analysis,
information product development and dissemination for ERW stakeholders and the public
at large. Collated ERW contamination data results codified into one (1) serialized
reference of all ERW contamination in for Cambodia. Maintain interactive, up-to-date
ERW contamination information and products.
•

Goal 1- National Audit of ERW Data/Information


Objective 1- Collect all available ERW data in compatible formats.



Objective 2- Collate and analyze all ERW data.

•

Goal 2- Create a Common National ERW Contamination Register

•

Goal 3- Systemized reporting of all ERW operations into common formats
and reports.

•

Goal 4- Develop a National ERW Information & Resource Center


•

Objective 1- Create ERW Information Services and Products

Goal 5- Maintain a National Library & Archive for ERW Data,
Information and Knowledge.

Threat Analysis, Define Impact & Risk Management
A full analysis of the National ERW threat facing Cambodia must be completed
as a baseline for all future planning. Following a National Audit of ERW Information a
threat analysis can be initiated utilizing the definition of threat munitions and
environments that they are located. Define the actual munitions, types, condition and
probable location of hazardous explosive material. Establish the impact of hazardous
explosive material has on the Cambodian population and determine the levels of
“acceptable risk”. Finally develop Risk Management Policies and Plans to mitigate the
impact/risk of hazardous explosive material in Cambodia.
•

Goal 1- Complete a threat analysis on munitions types, conditions and
locations in Cambodia.
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•

Goal 2- Define impact of hazardous explosive threats on the Cambodian
population

•

Goal 3- Establish minimum Acceptable Risk level for hazardous explosive
threat exposure to the Cambodian population

•

Goal 4- Establish a Risk Management Policy and Plans

Standards and Guidelines
National ERW Standards and Guidelines for all aspects of ERW Response must
be developed, published and distributed for public use. Five (5) Cambodia Mine Action
Standards and Guidelines (CMAS) standards published is a start point to revising and
completing the remaining standards for implementation. Fast track the development of
this fundamental documentation so the structuring of threat analysis, risk management,
operational and strategic planning can proceed efficiently.
Through an interactive process with stakeholders, review existing CMAS
documentation and prepare an interim National ERW Standards and Guidelines for
immediate use of operators in the field. Allow time for operators to transition their
organizations to ERW Response structures.
•

Goal 1- Establish a Technical Review Board and Update 2002 version of
standards for ERW requirements.

•

Goal 2- Complete a full complement of interim National ERW Standards
and Guidelines for the sector.

•

Goal 3 – Legislate and implement National ERW Standards and
Guidelines, phased with sector transitional plans.

Establish a National ERW Strategy
Transition from mine clearance centric planning to ERW themed national
strategic planning is required at this junction of Cambodia’s development progression.
The results of a comprehensive review of the National ERW Contamination audit, threat
analysis, definition of impact, and risk management necessitates a revision of the existing
strategy. A National ERW Strategy will more fully represent Cambodia’s humanitarian
and development needs for future generations.
•

Goals 1- Establish a National ERW Strategy
 Objective 1- Establish a National ERW Strategic Planning Group
 Objective 2 – Develop a National ERW Strategy White Paper and
Strategic Plan
 Objective 3- Legislate the National ERW White Paper, Strategy
Plan and Planning Process
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Objective 4- Develop Stakeholder Annual National ERW
Integrated Work Plans

Transitional End State Planning
As a result of a defining the roles and responsibilities of each ERW stakeholder
and introduction of an National ERW Strategy an environment is created to allow
organizations to think forward and develop future plans. Introduce “Transitional EndState Planning” as a guiding principle to achieve full national capacity before 2015.
•

Goal 1- Introduce “Transitional End State Planning” concept at all levels of
planning.

•

Goal 2- Create institutions that meet the long-term National ERW Response
requirements of the National ERW Strategy.

•

Goal 3 - Transition existing Mine Action resources into ERW Response
resources.

Knowledge Based ERW Community
The Mine Action community in Cambodia must entrench its established mine
action skill-based experience and transition to ERW knowledge based enterprising
institutions. Capturing and retaining knowledge, experience, and skills acquired over a
decade of development are necessary for achieving national self-sufficiency.
Develop the existing training facilities and human resources to create a
community that values its contributions, establishes standards for excellence and
professionalizes the ERW sector. Create centers of excellence to capture and maintain the
skills & knowledge through a National ERW Information Resource Center with National
ERW Training and Research & Development Center.
Develop a forward thinking National Human Resource Development plan which
will provide the best qualities of people, skills and knowledge necessary to carry the
ERW roles and responsibilities of the future.
•

Goal 1- Develop a knowledge based ERW community environment.


Objective 1- Create ERW Center(s) of Excellence.



Objective 2- Create a National Human Resource Development Plan.
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Institutional Level
Linked to strategic level planning is the development of institutional capacity to
push forward ERW Response development. These recommendations embody the
necessary measures for initial planning and development of organizational depth to meet
the challenges of the future.
National ERW Training & R&D Center
Long-term requirement for professional ERW services will be necessary in
Cambodia for several generations. Focus existing experienced trainers and create
advanced skilled human resources into a national training facility. Concentration of effort
into one (1) national center that services the entire ERW sector would benefit both
national and private sector stakeholders.
Develop a Research & Development facility to further the knowledge and develop
the necessary technologies and methodologies necessary to address the long-term needs
of the sector.
•

Goal 1- Strengthen existing CMAC training facilities into a national training
center for all ERW related skill and management training.

•

Goal 2- Develop a multi-agency training cadre (CMAC, RCAF, National
Police) servicing a full sector curriculum, with value-added services.

•

Goal 3- Co-locate and develop a National Research & Development capacity

ERW Human Resource Planning
Create plans and training curriculum for transitioning existing mine action
personnel into professional level ERW human resources.
•

Goal 1- Establish the skill and knowledge criteria for future ERW Response
programs and strategy requirements.

•

Goal 2- Implement a human resource training program to prepare individual,
teams, managers and organizations for their future roles in ERW Response.

•

Goal 3- Implement a human resource retirement process for redundant mine
action staff.

Community Risk Reduction
Develop government, community and ERW service provider synergy to reduce
community risks.
•

Goal 1- Integrate CBMRR & CBURR & National Police best practices into a
consolidated reporting network.
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•
•

Goal 2- Develop community mapping for local definition and ownership of
ERW contamination.
Goal 3- Integrate National Police reporting structure and develop EOD service
provider organizational cooperation.

Technical Survey & Area Reduction
Adopt recent technical survey & area reduction innovations into the main stream
of mine action as the main focal of activity to reclaim land and reduce risk for
communities.
•

Goal 1- Area Reduce suspected ERW contaminated areas as priority of
operations.

•

Goal 2- Integrate Explosive Detection Dogs and Mechanical Assistance into
Area Reduction Operations.

•

Goal 3- Develop National Area Reduction reporting criteria.

Advanced EOD-BAC Operations
Shift existing mine action resources towards advanced Explosive Ordnance
Disposal and Battle Area Clearance operations. Develop pro-active EOD-BAC operations
alongside existing reactive EOD operations.
•

Goal 1- Enhanced EOD-BAC operations for ERW contaminated areas by
development of EOD/BAC Heavy & Light operational units.

•

Goal 2- Develop ERW EOD-BAC operational/technical procedures with
standards, guidelines and SOP’s.

•

Goal 3- Integrated EOD-BAC operations with MRE, Technical Survey and
CBMRR/CBURR/National Police networks.

•

Goal 4- Develop knowledge and skill based EOD trainer/operators with bulk
demolition expertise.

National Quality Assurance Monitoring
Development of a Quality Assurance culture within National ERW stakeholders.
•

Goal 1- Establish Quality Assurance standards for National ERW
Stakeholders.

•

Goal 2- Define Internal & External Quality Assurance measures for CMAA,
CMAC, RCAF, National Police, International/National NGO’s and
Commercial operators. Based on National ERW standards and guidelines.
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ERW Technical Working Groups
Establish the environment for interactive technical cooperation between ERW
institutions to discuss, debate, development and enhance through dialogue the ERW
sector. Rotating TWG chairmanship amongst recognized ERW stakeholders to organize
dialogue and development sessions to professionalize the ERW sector.
•

Goal 1- Establish quarterly ERW Technical Working Groups.

•

Goal 2- Scheduled review of all ERW technical/operational issues and
introduction of innovative techniques, technologies and procedures.
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Operational Level
Recommendations at the operational level specifically identify key areas for
development.
Develop Technical Detection & Disposal Capacities
Develop methodologies and technology selection for EOD/BAC survey and
clearance appropriate to the Cambodian context. Enhance existing SOP’s to reflect
transition of mine clearance centric operations to integrated operations addressing the
challenges of active EOD and BAC operations.
•
•

Goal 1- Conduct a systems trial for the integration of survey methods and
clearance systems to address active EOD and BAC operations.
Goal 2- Establish EOD/BAC SOP’s that address the requirements and
standards for ERW risk/impact reduction.

Pro-Active Community Risk Reduction Operations
Using existing US bomb data issue all EOD teams with target folders of
contaminated areas in their areas of operations. Combine target folder information with
local community mapping to determine areas to focus ERW Response operations.
Initiate, pro-active EOD/BAC operations to “blitz” highly impacted community to
reduce risk. Increased level of reactive EOD teams positioned at district level throughout
Cambodia responding to the growing demand of CBMRR & CBURR and National Police
networks. Use existing scrap metal dealer location information in the L1S and the
collection network of the dealers themselves to reduce risk to communities in
collaboration with the National police.
• Goal 1 - Analysis existing bomb data and produce district level target folders
for commune level EOD/BAC operations. Integrate community mapping of
ERW contamination into EOD/BAC operations
•

Goal 2 - Pro-active Community Risk Reduction Operations that target highly
impacted communities with concentration of EOD/BAC resources.

•

Goal 3 – Increased Re-active EOD response at throughout known
contaminated district and specific targeting of scrap metal dealers across
Cambodia.
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Practical Measures in 2006
This study is about looking to the future with the “art of the possible” in mind.
The existing resources available in Cambodia with some limited support is completely
capable of designing the future of the ERW sector into comprehensive plans within a
twelve (12) month period.
A critical path, point of view is developing foundational impact and risk
documentation to serve as the stepping stones developing a National ERW Strategy.
These fundamental steps should be preformed in open dialogue through working groups
formed by the sector stakeholders. Each member of the working groups would commit to
supporting the development of the ERW sectors future, and CMAA would be responsible
for documenting the process.
A thorough analysis of existing ERW data and information to establish the scope
of the problem to be solved must be achieved before a National ERW Strategy is written.
Simultaneously, fundamental principles establishing definitions of impact and acceptable
risk enables clear articulation of ERW standards and guidelines. All these activities are
Impact, risk, and standards are reliant upon each other, however can be developed at the
same time leading to a foundation in which a National ERW Strategy can be based upon.
An achievable proposed schedule is recommended as follows:
a. Establish National ERW definition of “impact” and “acceptable risk”
(NLT July 06)’
b. Finalize National ERW Standards and Guidelines (NLT July 06)’
c. Collate, analysis full spectrum of ERW data and develop National ERW
Contamination baseline (NLT Sep 06),
d. Develop a National ERW Strategy (NLT Dec 06), and
e. Develop Transitional ERW “End State” Plans (NLT Feb 07)
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